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  • 1
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: Our experimental analysis of alliances in conflicts leads to three main findings. First, even in the absence of repeated interaction, direct contact or communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced than what would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this possible solidarity among 'brothers in arms' when fighting against an outside enemy may rapidly deteriorate or disappear as soon as the outside enemy disappears. Third, when fighting an outside enemy, 'brothers in arms' may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against the external enemy.
    Keywords: D72 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; alliance ; conflict ; contest ; free-riding ; hold-up problem ; solidarity ; Politischer Konflikt ; Internationale Zusammenarbeit ; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ; Solidarität ; Public Choice ; Theorie
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
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    Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
    Publication Date: 2015-11-26
    Description: Our experimental analysis of alliances in conflicts leads to three main findings. First, even in the absence of repeated interaction, direct contact or communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced than what would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this possible solidarity among brothers in arms when fighting against an outside enemy may rapidly deteriorate or disappear as soon as the outside enemy disappears. Third, when fighting an outside enemy, brothers in arms may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against the external enemy.
    Description: Unsere experimentelle Studie zu Allianzen in Konflikten führt zu drei Hauptergebnissen. Selbst ohne wiederholte Interaktion, direkten Kontakt oder Kommunikation zwischen den Teilnehmern ist das Trittbrettfahren der Mitglieder der Allianz viel weniger stark ausgeprägt, als es die nicht-kooperative Theorie erwarten lassen würde. Diese Solidarität zwischen den Kampfgefährten, die im Wettbewerb mit einem Außenstehenden zu beobachten ist, nimmt jedoch rapide ab, sobald der Gegner verschwunden ist. Im Kampf mit dem externen Gegner können die Kampfgefährten bereits damit rechnen, dass es zu einem internen Konflikt über die Aufteilung der Kriegsbeute kommen wird; dieser folgende interne Verteilungskonflikt hält die Mitglieder der Allianz jedoch nicht davon ab, einen hohen Einsatz im Kampf mit dem externen Gegner zu leisten.
    Keywords: D72 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; Alliance ; conflict ; contest ; free-riding ; hold-up problem ; solidarity
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 3
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    Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
    Publication Date: 2015-11-26
    Description: Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem.
    Keywords: D72 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; conflict ; contest ; alliance ; hold-up problem ; experiment ; Konflikt ; Bündnissystem ; Sunk Costs ; Test
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 4
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    ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
    Publication Date: 2013-05-22
    Description: The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members fight against each other about the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after the break-up of the alliance. Former brothers in arms fight even more vigorously against each other than strangers do. Further, this vigorous internal fighting is anticipated and reduces the ability of the alliance to mobilize joint fighting effort, compared to a situation in which victorious alliance members share equally and peacefully.
    Keywords: D72 ; D74 ; D70 ; ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:conferenceObject
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  • 5
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This paper presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of fighting. In turn, anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance's ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make non-binding declarations on non-aggression in the relationship between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players' contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting.
    Keywords: D72 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; conflict ; contest ; alliance ; endogenous internal conflict ; hold-up problem ; non-aggression pact ; experiment ; Konflikt ; Bündnissystem ; Sunk Costs ; Test
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 6
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    München: Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
    Publication Date: 2020-05-19
    Description: Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This paper presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of fighting. In turn, anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance's ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make non-binding declarations on non-aggression in the relationship between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players' contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting.
    Keywords: D72 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; Conflict ; Contest ; Alliance ; Endogenous internal conflict ; Hold-up problem ; Non-aggression pact ; Experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 7
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    München: Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
    Publication Date: 2020-05-19
    Description: Alliances often face both free-riding and hold-up problems, which under- mine the effectiveness of alliances in mobilizing joint fighting effort. Despite of these disadvantages, alliances are still ubiquitous in all types of contests. This paper asks if there are non-monetary incentives to form alliances, e.g., intimidating/discouraging the single player(s) who is/are left alone. For this purpose, I compare symmetric (2 vs. 2) and asymmetric (2 vs. 1) contests to their equivalent 4-player and 3-player individual contests, respectively. We find that alliance players in symmetric (2 vs. 2) contests behave the same as those in equivalent 4-player individual contests. However, in asymmetric (2 vs. 1) contests, stand-alone players were strongly discouraged to exert effort (especially the females), compared to the 3-player individual contests. Alliance players may have anticipated this effect and also reduced their effort, if alliances share the prize according to the merit rule. Behavioural factors such as the need to belong can help reconcile the paradox of alliance formation.
    Keywords: D72 ; D74 ; C91 ; ddc:330 ; Alliance Formation ; Contest and Conflict ; Experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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