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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    R & D management 16 (1986), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1467-9310
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The authors state that the main need in the microcomputer field is not hardware or applications software but policies for linking microcomputers to company databases and information stores, referred to as communication capability. The paper presents a conceptual framework for the structure and degree of connectivity among the company microcomputer-based information systems. The management problem is to find the right trade-offs between the advantages to the individual having an autonomous dedicated microcomputer against the disadvantages to the organization of duplicated effort and data, and a fragmented information system.To find the optimum trade-off the management has to take into account five major issues; the desirable degree of compatibility of hardware and software; hidden and obvious costs; impact on the user; change with time; and organizational issues.The authors analyse two sets of variables, those affecting the system and those affecting the individual, and identify about eight sub-variables each of which should be taken into account when deciding the desirable level of performance of the total system. They reject a global multi-criterion decision-making approach and propose instead the division of the system into three levels each having its own criteria of performance and each its own degree of mutual connectivity. These are respectively, site-wide applications (maximum connectivity), special applications uniting a sub-set of individuals, and personal applications exclusively oriented on a single person.The paper concludes with guidelines for future study, mainly to clarify the issues, and a sketch of a prescriptive framework for organizational policy.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 24 (1995), S. 293-319 
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: auctions ; common value ; information ; laboratory experiments
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Comparative static tests of Nash bidding theory in second-price common value auctions show that bidders fail to respond in the right direction to more rivals and to public information concerning the value of the item. The former provides a clear indication that bidders fail to appreciate the adverse selection forces inherent in common value auctions, while the latter shows that policy prescriptions can fail given out-of-equilibrium behavior. These tests of Nash bidding theory apply to a far wider variety of circumstances than in first-price auctions, so there is less scope to rationalize the failure of the theory.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
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    Kiel und Hamburg: ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
    Publication Date: 2015-02-17
    Description: The Winner s Curse (WC) is a non-equilibrium behavior in common-value auctions involving systematic and persistent overbidding that often results in signi ficant losses. It is one of the most robust fi ndings in laboratory experiments. We developed an auction mechanism with a payment rule that internalizes the adverse selection by inducing a simple strategy, sincere bidding, as no-regret equilibrium. Other less efficient payment rules, that use more than the minimal information needed, may also induce sincere bidding as equilibrium. However, given concerns with the WC, we study whether such less minimal rules can help bidders find their way to equilibrium bidding. Our main experimental fi ndings are that the no-regret minimal payment rule results in more WC than the English auction. Yet, a less efficient but more intuitive payment rule addresses overbidding better than the minimal payment rule and, remarkably for a static, sealed-bid design, matches the performance of the English auction.
    Keywords: C92 ; D44 ; C72 ; ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:conferenceObject
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  • 4
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    Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-02
    Description: This paper reports the results of a series of experiments designed to test whether and to what extent individuals succumb to the conjunction fallacy. Using an experimental design of Kahneman and Tversky (1983), it finds that given mild incentives, the proportion of individuals who violate the conjunction principle is significantly lower than that reported by Kahneman and Tversky. Moreover, when subjects are allowed to consult with other subjects, these proportions fall dramatically, particularly when the size of the group rises from two to three. These findings cast serious doubts about the importance and robustness of such violations for the understanding of real-life economic decisions.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Conjunction fallacy ; representativeness bias ; group consultation ; incentives ; Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit ; Rationales Verhalten ; Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung ; Test
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 5
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    Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics
    Publication Date: 2018-07-02
    Description: This paper reports the results of experiments designed to test (a) whether and to what extent individuals display non-neutral ambiguity attitudes in their choice behavior and (b) if and how do ambiguity attitudes change as a result of interpersonal interactions and persuasion. To address the first question we designed and conducted experiments involving individual choice between betting on ambiguous and unambiguous events of their choice. We found that a large majority of subjects display ambiguity-neutral attitudes, many others display ambiguity-incoherent attitudes, and few subjects display either ambiguity-averse attitudes or ambiguity-seeking attitudes. To address the second question we introduced a new experimental design with a built-in incentive to persuade. We found that interpersonal interactions without incentive to persuade have no effect on behavior, but when incentives were introduced, the ambiguity-neutral subjects were better able to persuade ambiguity seeking and ambiguity-incoherent subjects to follow ambiguity-neutral choice behavior. No such influence was detected with respect to ambiguity-neutral subjects.
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 6
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    London: Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
    Publication Date: 2018-11-26
    Description: Through a series of decision tasks involving colored cards, we provide separate measures of Bayesian updating and non-probabilistic reasoning skills. We apply these measures to (and are the first to study) a common-value Dutch auction. This format is more salient than the strategically equivalent first-price auction and silent Dutch formats in hinting that one should condition one's estimate of the value on having the highest bid. Both Bayesian updating skills and non-probabilistic reasoning skills are shown to help subjects correct for the winner's curse, as does the saliency of the active-clock Dutch format.
    Keywords: D4 ; D7 ; D8 ; ddc:330 ; Bayesian updating ; Non-probabilistic reasoning ; Dutch auction
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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