WILBERT

Wildauer Bücher+E-Medien Recherche-Tool

feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Evanston, IL: Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
    Publication Date: 2020-01-17
    Description: We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens suþer from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes; and how candidates may exploit this eþect to their interest.
    Keywords: D72 ; ddc:330 ; Network ; voting ; cross-cutting ; Wahlverhalten ; Soziales Verhalten ; Soziales Netzwerk ; Gleichgewicht ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Theorie
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Innsbruck: University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
    Publication Date: 2018-11-23
    Description: This paper studies an evolutionary model of network formation with endogenous decay, in which agents benefit both from direct and indirect connections. In addition to forming (costly) links, agents choose actions for a coordination game that determines the level of decay of each link. We address the issues of coordination (long-run equilibrium selection) and network formation by means of stochastic stability techniques. We find that both the link cost and the trade-off between efficiency and risk-dominance play a crucial role in the long-run behavior of the system.
    Keywords: C72 ; C73 ; D83 ; D85 ; ddc:330 ; Coordination ; Networks ; Risk dominance ; stochastic stability ; Koordination ; Soziales Netzwerk ; Stochastischer Prozess ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Evolutionäre Spieltheorie ; Theorie
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Innsbruck: University of Innsbruck, Department of Public Finance
    Publication Date: 2018-11-23
    Description: The paper reports an experimental study based on a variant of the popular Chinos game, which is used as a simple but paradigmatic instance of observational learning. There are three players, arranged in sequence, each of whom wins a fixed price if she manages to guess the total number of coins lying in everybody's hands. Our evidence shows that, despite the remarkable frequency of equilibrium outcomes, deviations from optimal play are also significant. And when such deviations occur, we find that, for any given player position, the probability of a mistake is increasing in the probability of a mistake of her predecessors. This is what we call an error cascade, which we which we measure by way of two alternative models.
    Keywords: C92 ; D8 ; ddc:330 ; positional learning ; error cascades ; Spieltheorie ; Lernprozess ; Unvollkommene Information ; Statistischer Fehler ; Theorie
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 4
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
    Publication Date: 2019-10-22
    Description: The effectiveness of social interaction depends strongly on an ability to coordinate actions efficiently. In large networks, such coordination may be very difficult to achieve and may depend on the communication technology and the network structure. We examine how pre-play communication and clustering within networks affect coordination in a challenging experimental game on eight-person networks. Free-form chat is enormously effective in achieving the nonequilibrium efficient outcome in our game, but restricted communication (where subjects can only indicate their intended action) is almost entirely ineffective. We can rationalize this result with a novel model about the credibility of cheap-talk messages. This credibility is much larger with freeform message communication than with restricted communication. We are the first to model this credibility and show, both theoretically and experimentally, an interaction effect of network structure and communication technologies. We also provide a model of message diffusion, which indeed predicts that diffusion will be more rapid without clustering and is consistent with our data.
    Keywords: C71 ; C91 ; D03 ; D85 ; ddc:330 ; Networks ; Clustering ; Communication ; Credibility ; Cheap talk ; Experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 5
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2019-08-22
    Description: The effectiveness of social interaction depends strongly on an ability to coordinate actions efficiently. In large networks, such coordination may be very difficult to achieve and may depend on the communication technology and the network structure. We examine how pre-play communication and clustering within networks affect coordination in a challenging experimental game on eight-person networks. Free-form chat is enormously effective in achieving the non-equilibrium efficient outcome in our game, but restricted communication (where subjects can only indicate their intended action) is almost entirely ineffective. We can rationalize this result with a novel model about the credibility of cheap-talk messages. This credibility is much larger with freeform message communication than with restricted communication. We are the first to model this credibility and show, both theoretically and experimentally, an interaction effect of network structure and communication technologies. We also provide a model of message diffusion, which indeed predicts that diffusion will be more rapid without clustering and is consistent with our data.
    Keywords: C71 ; C91 ; D03 ; D85 ; ddc:330 ; networks ; clustering ; communication ; credibility ; cheap talk ; experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 6
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2019-09-04
    Description: The effectiveness of social interaction depends strongly on an ability to coordinate actions efficiently. In large networks, such coordination may be very difficult to achieve and may depend on the communication technology and the network structure. We examine how pre-play communication and clustering within networks affect coordination in a challenging experimental game on eight-person networks. Free-form chat is enormously effective in achieving the nonequilibrium efficient outcome in our game, but restricted communication (where subjects can only indicate their intended action) is almost entirely ineffective. We can rationalize this result with a novel model about the credibility of cheap-talk messages. This credibility is much larger with freeform message communication than with restricted communication. We are the first to model this credibility and show, both theoretically and experimentally, an interaction effect of network structure and communication technologies. We also provide a model of message diffusion, which indeed predicts that diffusion will be more rapid without clustering and is consistent with our data.
    Keywords: C71 ; C91 ; D03 ; D85 ; ddc:330 ; networks ; clustering ; communication ; credibility ; cheap talk ; experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 7
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Heidelberg: Springer
    Publication Date: 2017-05-30
    Description: We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of thewhole group. Themodel assumes that agents are imperfect conditional cooperators, that they infer unobserved contributions assuming imperfect conditional cooperation by others, and that they have some degree of bounded rationality. We show that our model approximates quite accurately regularities derived from public goods game experiments.
    Keywords: H41 ; C92 ; ddc:330 ; Public good ; Networks ; Decay
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 8
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-07-14
    Description: This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games. Our subjects provide low-quality information even when doing so does not increase their monetary payoff.
    Keywords: D83 ; C72 ; G14 ; ddc:330 ; experiment ; cheap talk ; auction ; information acquisition ; information sale
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 9
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Heidelberg: Springer
    Publication Date: 2013-07-18
    Description: We propose a spatial competition model to study banks' strategic responses to the asymmetric Spanish geographic deregulation process. We find that once the geographic deregulation process finishes, inter-regional mergers between savings banks are optimal whenever the economies of scale associated to merging activities are low. If there are large gains, then there will be mergers between savings and commercial banks.
    Keywords: C72 ; G21 ; G28 ; L13 ; L41 ; L51 ; ddc:330 ; branch deregulation ; mergers ; optimal behavior ; Spanish banking system ; Bankenregulierung ; Deregulierung ; Bank ; Fusion ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Spanien
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 10
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-15
    Description: In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a more general network structure and we examine equilibrium selection. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Since economic environments typically have a considerable degree of complementarity or substitutability, this framework applies to a wide variety of settings. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, in particular with incomplete information. Behavior closely resembles the theoretical equilibrium whenever this is unique; when there are multiple equilibria, general features of networks, such as connectivity, clustering, and the degree of the players, help to predict informed behavior in the lab. People appear to be strongly attracted to maximizing aggregate payoffs (social efficiency), but there are forces that moderate this attraction: 1) people seem content with (in the aggregate) capturing only the lion's share of the efficient profits in exchange for reduced exposure to loss, and 2) uncertainty about the network structure makes it considerably more difficult to coordinate on a demanding, but efficient, equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information.
    Keywords: C71 ; C91 ; D03 ; D85 ; ddc:330 ; random networks ; incomplete information ; connectivity ; clustering ; strategic substitutes ; strategic complements ; experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...