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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Munksgaard International Publishers
    ISSN: 1600-051X
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Medicine
    Notes: Objectives: To test whether neutrophil numbers are directly correlated with interleukin-1α (IL-1α) concentrations in gingival crevicular fluid (GCF) of patients with periodontitis, and to investigate the effects of smoking on these parameters.Materials and Methods: A total of 99 GCF samples from 33 patients (14 smokers) suffering from severe chronic periodontitis were collected using Durapore™ filter strips. Polymorphonuclear leucocyte (PMN) numbers were counted using a Coulter cell counter and IL-1α levels were determined by ELISA. Total GCF protein was measured by Bio-Rad assay as a surrogate measure of GCF volume.Results: Mean IL-1α concentrations were significantly reduced in smokers compared with non-smokers (non-smokers: 3.29±2.02 pg/μg protein, smokers 1.59±1.13 pg/μg protein). There was no association between PMN numbers and IL-1α concentrations found when analysed either by site or by patient. PMN numbers were not significantly different between the two groups (non-smokers: 1.16 × 106±1.04 × 106; smokers: 7.30 × 105±8.07 × 105). Smoking did not affect mean total protein concentration of samples.Conclusions: Smoking significantly decreased IL-1α concentrations in GCF without affecting GCF volume sampled. The lack of association between IL-1α concentration and neutrophil numbers suggests that the reduced IL-1α concentrations seen in smokers is independent of any possible effect of smoking on neutrophil chemotaxis, and further suggests that smoking may directly inhibit IL-1α production.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
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    Brussels: Bruegel
    Publication Date: 2019-11-28
    Description: We study the impact of industrial robots on employment and wages in six European Union countries, that make up 85.5 percent of the EU industrial robots market. In theory, robots can directly displace workers from performing specific tasks (displacement effect). But they can also expand labour demand through the efficiencies they bring to industrial production (productivity effect). We adopt the local labour market equilibrium approach developed by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) to assess which of the two labour market effects dominates. We find that one additional robot per thousand workers reduces the employment rate by 0.16-0.20 percentage points. Thus a significant displacement effect dominates. We find that the displacement effect is particularly evident for workers of middle education and for young cohorts. Our estimates, however, do not point to robust and significant results on the impact of robots on wage growth, even after accounting for possible offsetting effects across different populations and sectoral groups.
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 3
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    Brussels: Bruegel
    Publication Date: 2018-01-20
    Description: On 25 November 2015, the European Union enacted new rules for international mobile roaming (IMR) under Regulation 2015/2120, which seeks to implement a Roam Like at Home (RLAH) regime among the member states of the European Union. Questions remain, however, as to whether it is possible to implement RLAH without mandating below-cost pricing and thus introducing significant regulatory and economic distortions. It is difficult to see how RLAH could be implemented for other than trivial amounts of IMR traffic without significant cross-subsidisation of the IMR service in many different dimensions. Identifying ways to maintain the ubiquity of the IMR service without unduly distorting the economics of European mobile markets and networks would appear to pose serious challenges; the saving grace, however, might well be that IMR revenue now represents a small enough fraction of total mobile revenue (thanks to previous regulation) that the necessary cross-subsidies might be manageable. The European Commission, which is required to assess the situation and to provide legislative proposals by 15 June 2016, faces a daunting task.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Mobilkommunikation ; International ; Telekommunikationspreis ; Preisregulierung ; Telekommunikationspolitik ; EU-Staaten
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 4
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    Brussels: Bruegel
    Publication Date: 2018-01-20
    Description: Coordinating the timing and location of new production facilities is one of the challenges of liberalized power sectors. It is complicated by the presence of transmission bottlenecks, oligopolistic competition, and the unknown prospects of low-carbon technologies. The authors build a model encompassing a late and early investment stage, a clean (green) and dirty (brown) technologies, and a single transmission bottleneck and compare dynamic efficiency of several market designs. Allocating network access on a short-term competitive basis distorts investment decisions as brown firms will pre-empt green competitors by investing early. Compensating early investors for future network congestion, as for instance in the E.U., only exacerbates this problem. Dynamic efficiency is restored with long-term transmission rights that can be traded on a secondary market (iusvendendi). As early investment lowers the resale value of the transmission rights, brown firms will invest optimally. The authors show that dynamic efficiency does not require the existence of physical rights for accessing the transmission line (ius utendi), but financial rights on receiving the scarcity revenues generated by the transmission line (ius fructendi) suffice.
    Keywords: L94 ; L13 ; C72 ; D43 ; ddc:330 ; Congestion management ; access regulation ; real option theory ; electricity markets
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 5
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    Brussels: Bruegel
    Publication Date: 2018-02-28
    Description: In its Digital Single Market strategy, the European Commission has rightly noted the importance of reducing the price paid for basic cross-border parcel delivery by consumers and by small and medium size retail senders. The payment flows for cross-border parcel delivery are strikingly similar to those for telecommunications. Comparisons with roaming can be instructive. As with roaming, it is clear that the links between wholesale payments between the national postal operators and retail prices need to be properly understood in order to craft good policy. Another useful lesson is that national postal regulatory authorities are unlikely to address cross-border problems because of limitations in their respective mandates and because they have no incentive to take measures to benefit residents of other countries. There are also significant differences between roaming and parcel delivery. While high wholesale charges were a major driver of high retail prices for international mobile roaming, the wholesale payments for cross-border parcel delivery appear to be below cost. This implies that it is the 'spread' between retail price and the wholesale payment that is inflated, at least for small retail senders and for consumers. Comprehensive statistics gathering, coordinated at European level, is indispensable.
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:report
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  • 6
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    Brussels: Bruegel
    Publication Date: 2018-02-28
    Description: The collaborative economy matches people online who want to share assets and services. This Policy Contribution - i) discusses how the collaborative economy can be defined; ii) provides an overview of evidence about its potential benefits for European economies and the impact of specific platforms in the sectors of their operation; iii) illustrates the criteria that enable professional and non-professional services offered through collaborative platforms to be distinguished; iv) recommends priorities for the platforms so that they can create a safe and transparent environment for the transactions of their users; v) discusses further regulatory concerns and how they should be approached. The collaborative economy is characterised by a great variety of business models. It spans multiple sectors each of which has its own market characteristics. A single definition is therefore beyond reach. However, a common element in the majority of business models is the use of under-utilised assets for the extraction of economic benefits. There is evidence that Europe could enjoy major economic gains from the collaborative economy, especially if barriers are removed and the regulatory framework is adjusted to better accommodate platforms. However, in particular sectors such as ride-sharing and short-term accommodation, the benefits from the operation of platforms come at a cost because platforms can have a detrimental effect on ‘traditional’ incumbent operators. The technology is thus disruptive to many traditional businesses. While under EU legislation it is not clear when services supplied through collaborative platforms can be classified as professional, a careful examination of business models on a case-by-case basis can help to define some relevant criteria. The frequency with which a service is provided, the provider’s motive and the associated remuneration are three important aspects that enable professional and non-professional services to be distinguished. As intermediaries, collaborative platforms have access to a large volume of information about the market and about their users, which is not available to other market participants or the regulator. Consumer protection requires a safe and transparent environment for transactions. Platforms based on their market position could be very helpful with this respect. Legal certainty and regulatory clarity are also required to incentivise further investment in efficient information technologies and platforms. The current uncertainty over the status of the collaborative economy platforms, legal disputes in national and European courts and decisions to restrict the operation of platforms at local/city levels create an environment in which it is difficult to attract new investment in Europe. Regulatory authorities should move quickly to define the framework of the operation of such platforms to restore investors’ confidence. Local regulation is very important for defining the operational framework of collaborative platforms that can bring the greatest benefits to local economies. But an EU-wide approach is also needed to define the general framework of the operation of these platforms and to address in a decisive and clear way the associated regulatory concerns
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:report
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  • 7
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    Unknown
    Heidelberg: Springer
    Publication Date: 2018-09-05
    Description: The rise of the collaborative economy platforms reveals that policymakers need to start thinking about how to introduce flexibility in the provision of services in these formal relationships with adequate protection for all of the involved parties.
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
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  • 8
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    Calgary: International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
    Publication Date: 2020-04-23
    Description: In its Digital Single Market (DSM) strategy, the European Commission has rightly noted the importance of lowering the price paid for basic cross-border delivery by consumers and by small and medium size retail shippers. Consumers and SMEs may have few alternatives to the National Postal Operators (NPOs), or may be unaware of the options that they have. These concerns led to the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal in May 2016.3 With its legislative proposal, the Commission has sought (1) to strengthen the data gathering powers of Member State postal regulatory authorities, and to oblige them to collect data at both retail and wholesale levels; (2) to increase transparency into pricing for those who use cross-border parcel delivery services; (3) to oblige Member State postal regulatory authorities to assess annually the affordability of these services; and (4) to open cross-border Terminal Dues (TD) and Inward Land Rates (ILR) arrangements to competitors There are parallels that can be drawn between the payment flows for cross-border parcel delivery and those of telecommunications, especially those of international mobile roaming. As with roaming, it is clear that the linkages between wholesale payments between and corresponding retail prices need to be properly understood in order to craft good policy. Another useful lesson is that Member State postal regulatory authorities are unlikely to address cross-border problems not only because of limitations in their respective mandates, but also because they have no incentive to take challenging measures to benefit residents of other countries. There are, however, also important differences between roaming versus parcel delivery. Where high wholesale charges were a major driver of high retail prices for international mobile roaming, the wholesale payments for cross-border parcel delivery appear instead to be below cost. This implies that it is the “spread” between retail price and the wholesale payment that is inflated, at least for small retail shippers and for consumers. Reviewing the Commission's proposed Regulation with all of this in mind, it appears to be on target. The main question that remains open is whether NPOs will be able to adjust TD and ILR rates upward to reflect true costs, as they will be strongly motivated to do; here as well, however, there are grounds for cautious optimism.
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:conferenceObject
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  • 9
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    Unknown
    Calgary: International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
    Publication Date: 2020-04-23
    Description: What policy measures might contribute to greater use of e‐commerce within the Asia‐Pacific region, especially on a cross‐border basis? What are the potential benefits, versus the potential costs? How feasible might it be to implement such measures? Surveys of consumers and merchants suggest that the Asia Pacific region is subject to challenges similar to those in Europe, where cross‐border e‐commerce has been a major policy focus for the past few years. We attempt in this paper to make a preliminary assessment of the applicability of European approaches to the strengthening of e‐commerce in the Asia Pacific region.
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:conferenceObject
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  • 10
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    Unknown
    Calgary: International Telecommunications Society (ITS)
    Publication Date: 2020-04-23
    Description: In September 2016, the European Commission presented legislative proposals to replace the European Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications (RFEC) with a new European Electronic Communications Code. Among the many stated objectives was to stimulate more rapid investment in fast and ultra-fast broadband. One can argue that the RFEC was put in place in 2002, at a time when networks were not yet liberalised or privatised, and when investment needs of existing copper networks were fairly consistent and predictable. As a consequence, the RFEC put great emphasis on achieving competition, relatively little on achieving investment. This reflects to some extent a preference for optimisation of static efficiency over dynamic efficiency, which was perhaps in order given that the former is far easier to analyse than the latter. In this paper, we review the regulatory instruments that provided in the European Code, and consider based on the economic literature, publicly available statistics, and our own analysis the degree to which the Action Lines in the proposed European Code are likely (individually or collectively) to contribute to increased investment in fast broadband in practice. Our assessment is that the proposed enhancements to broadband policy in the proposed European Code are broadly in the right direction, and collectively are likely to offer network operators a more profitable and predictable business case for investment in high speed broadband. Notwithstanding our observations that the case for FTTP/FTTP can often be significantly overblown, we would still say that this is a welcome or overdue change. The risks implied by insufficient specification of these provisions in the European Code, and the lack of clarity as regards technological neutrality, are however significant. We would hope that these provisions can be sharpened in the course of the legislative process.
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:conferenceObject
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