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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bingley : Emerald
    International journal of manpower 22 (2001), S. 83-98 
    ISSN: 0143-7720
    Source: Emerald Fulltext Archive Database 1994-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In relation to the analysis of inequality and skill-bias innovation, this article develops a theoretical model for determining the influence of work organisation on incentives and earnings. In a linear agency model, which explains innovative work organisation practices from an incentive perspective, we show that the static impact of organisational forms on expected earnings can be decomposed into two effects (a risk premium effect and a task complementarity effect originated in learning and information diffusion). Such effects drive productivity and expected pay-offs upward, as observed in many recent empirical studies. Thus, the development of new work practices based on a greater degree of delegation contributes to the increase of earnings inequality. In a dynamic perspective, the model shows that knowledge dissemination will in general sustain the same trend. However, when initial efforts and productivity are relatively high, output and pay-offs will decline during the transition to the steady-state. The overall impact of organisational forms on earnings and inequality may therefore be ambiguous, depending on the importance of learning.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bingley : Emerald
    International journal of manpower 24 (2003), S. 743-749 
    ISSN: 0143-7720
    Source: Emerald Fulltext Archive Database 1994-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Introduces the special issue on personnel economics and outlines the themes discussed in the papers contained within.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Labour 10 (1996), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1467-9914
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: : This contribution endorses the transactional trilogy of institutional economics in order to suggest a theoretical framework for re-examining the relationships between unemployment, labour institutions, and technological and organisational innovation. Labour institutions are usually called into question in the debates on European unemployment. Although the advocates of the biased technological change thesis defend it in order to improve the employment of unskilled workers, this article argues that a deregulation of the labour market may in fact generate losses of dynamic efficiency with respect to knowledge accumulation, the organisation of production and national capabilities of innovation. In addition, the impact of technological and organisational innovation on employment partly depends on the capabilities of firms and nations to initiate institutional learning, regarding bargaining, managerial and rationing transactions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
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    Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2019-09-04
    Description: We consider the external validity of laboratory measures of risk attitude. Based on a large-scale experiment using a representative panel of the Dutch population, we test if these measures can explain two different types of behavior: (i) behavior in laboratory risky financial decisions, and (ii) behavior in naturally-occurring field behavior under risk (financial, health and employment decisions). We find that measures of risk attitude are related to behavior in laboratory financial decisions and the most complex measures are outperformed by simpler measures. However, measures of risk attitude are not related to risk-taking in the field, calling into question the methods currently used for the purpose of measuring actual risk preferences. We conclude that while the external validity of measures of risk attitude holds in closely related frameworks, this validity is compromised in more remote settings.
    Keywords: C91 ; C93 ; D81 ; ddc:330 ; lab-in-the-field experiment ; elicitation methods ; risk preferences
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 5
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    Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2019-03-01
    Description: The memory people have of their past behavior is one of the main sources of information about themselves. To study whether people retrieve their memory self-servingly in social encounters, we designed an experiment in which participants play binary dictator games and then have to recall the amounts allocated to the receivers. We find evidence of motivated memory through selective recalls: dictators remember more their altruistic than their selfish choices. A causal effect of the responsibility of decisions is identified, as the recall asymmetry disappears when options are selected randomly by the computer program. Incentivizing memory accuracy increases the percentage of dictators' correct recalls only when they behaved altruistically. In contrast, there is no clear evidence of motivated memory through biased, i.e., overly optimistic recalls: dictators recall selectively but they do not bias strategically the direction and magnitude of these recalls.
    Keywords: C91 ; D91 ; D63 ; D64 ; ddc:330 ; motivated memory ; selective recall ; self-image ; Dictator Game ; experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 6
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    Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2019-03-01
    Description: In a laboratory experiment we test the interaction effects of status and group identity on interpersonal trust. Natural group identity is generated by school affiliation. Status (expert or agent) is awarded based on relative performance in a math quiz that is ex ante less favorable to the subjects from one group. We find that "promoted" trustors (individuals from the disadvantaged group that nevertheless achieve the status of expert) trust less both in-group and out-group trustees, compared to the other members of their group. Rather than playing against the effects of natural group identity, status promotion singles-out individuals. In contrast, trustworthiness is not affected by status and there is no evidence that interacting with promoted individuals impacts trust or trustworthiness.
    Keywords: C92 ; D91 ; J62 ; ddc:330 ; trust ; status ; group identity ; social mobility ; experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 7
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    Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Tinbergen Institute
    Publication Date: 2019-10-31
    Description: We investigate the role of advisers in the transmission of ethically relevant information, a critical aspect of executive decision making in organizations. In our laboratory experiment, advisers are informed about the negative externalities associated with the decision-maker's choices and compete with other advisers. We find that advisers suppress about a quarter of "inconvenient'' information. Suppression is not strategic, but based on the advisers' own preferences in the ethical dilemma. On the demand side, a substantial minority of decision makers avoid advisers who transmit inconvenient information (they "shoot the messenger''). Overall, by facilitating assortative matching, a competitive market for advisers efficiently caters to the demand for both information and information avoidance. Decision-makers are less likely to implement their preferred option when they are randomly matched to advisers and there is no scope for assortative matching.
    Keywords: D91 ; C91 ; D83 ; D82 ; ddc:330 ; Self-deception ; information avoidance ; unethical behavior ; experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 8
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    Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2019-12-04
    Description: We present experiments exploring why high ability workers join teams with less able co-workers when there are no short-term financial benefits. We distinguish between two explanations: pro-social preferences and expected long-term financial gains from teaching future teammates. Participants perform a real-effort task and decide whether to work independently or join a two-person team. Treatments vary the payment scheme (piece rate or revenue sharing), whether teammates can communicate, and the role of teaching. High ability workers are more willing to join teams in the absence of revenue sharing and less willing to join teams when they cannot communicate. When communication is possible, the choice of high ability workers to join teams is driven by expected future financial gains from teaching rather than some variety of pro-social preferences. This result has important implications for the role of adverse selection in determining the productivity of teams.
    Keywords: C92 ; D23 ; M52 ; M53 ; J24 ; ddc:330 ; teams ; teaching ; revenue sharing ; social preferences ; self-selection ; experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 9
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others' behavior. Subjects have to decide between a 'registered' income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an 'unregistered' income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on whether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk of detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment; (ii) many subjects choose an option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands; Walloons evade taxes less than the Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging.rformance and provide reliable estimates of the policy model coefficients associated with small central bank losses, in particular during periods of high macroeconomic uncertainty.
    Keywords: H26 ; H31 ; I38 ; C91 ; ddc:330 ; tax evasion ; social fraud ; social comparisons ; cross-country comparisons ; experiments ; Steuerkriminalität ; Steuerflucht ; Sozialversicherung ; Sozialhilfe ; Betrug ; Normbefolgung ; Vergleich ; Test ; Belgien ; Frankreich ; Niederlande
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 10
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    Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-15
    Description: We investigate the impact of various audit schemes on the future provision of public goods, when contributing less than the average of the group is sanctioned exogenously and the probability of an audit is unknown. We study how individuals update their beliefs about the probability of being audited, both before and after audits are definitely withdrawn. We find that when individuals have initially experienced systematic audits, they decrease both their beliefs and their contributions almost immediately after audits are withdrawn. In contrast, when audits were initially less frequent and more irregular, they maintain high beliefs about the probability of being audited and continue cooperating long after audits have been withdrawn. Inconsistency in experiencing audits across time clearly increases the difficulty of learning the true audit probabilities. Thus, conducting less frequent and irregular audits with higher fines can increase efficiency dramatically.
    Keywords: C92 ; H41 ; D83 ; ddc:330 ; ambiguity ; audits ; sanctions ; beliefs ; cooperation ; public goods ; experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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