WILBERT

Wildauer Bücher+E-Medien Recherche-Tool

feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • English  (133)
Collection
Publisher
Language
  • 1
    E-Resource
    E-Resource
    Berlin ; Heidelberg : Springer ; Volume 1-
    Associated volumes
    Keywords: Monografische Reihe
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    ISSN: 2196-002X
    Language: English
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Konstanz: Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
    Publication Date: 2020-01-22
    Description: A rich person who fears a loss of income may later favor redistributive taxation and a mix of taxes and public goods that differs from the one he now favors. If mobility is costly, and if government in each period uses majority voting to determine policy, then this person may prefer to live in a community that is permanently ruled by poor residents. Majority voting is a mechanism that can overcome intertemporal commitment problems of income insurance.
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2019-12-29
    Description: The future consequences of climate change are highly uncertain. Today, the exact size of possible future damages are widely unknown. Governments try to cope with these risks by investing in mitigation and adaptation measures. Mitigation aims at a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions whereas adaptation reduces the follow-up costs of climate change. In contrast to the existing literature, we explicitly model the decision of risk-averse governments on mitigation and adaptation policies. Furthermore we also consider the interaction of the two strategies. Mitigation efforts of a single country trigger crowding out as other countries will reduce their mitigation efforts. We show that, under fairly mild conditions, a unilateral increase in mitigation efforts of a single country can even increase global emissions. In contrast, a unilateral commitment to large adaptation efforts benefits the single country and may reduce the global risk from climate change at the expense of other countries.
    Keywords: Q54 ; Q58 ; ddc:330 ; climate change ; adaptation ; mitigation ; risk-taking ; Klimaveränderung ; Umweltpolitik ; Immissionsschutz ; Politische Entscheidung
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 4
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2019-12-04
    Description: Some of the member states of the European Union sell citizenship or residence to wealthy foreign investors. We analyse these "golden-passport" programs as a study in the political economy of conflict and cooperation in an international meta-club. Seen through the lens of club goods theory, the EU is a club of nations, each of which can be interpreted as itself a club. Each single nation reserves the right to govern the admission of new individual members into its own club, and new members automatically benefit from the EU wide meta-club good. We characterize the unique equilibrium when individual clubs that may differ in membership size are free to choose the terms on which they admit members, and evaluate it from the point of view of the wellbeing of the set of clubs as a whole. We identify club size and benefits as well as differences in cost externalities as the key determinants. We also consider how the set of clubs as a whole can respond to the economic inefficiency problems such a situation creates.
    Keywords: F15 ; F53 ; H77 ; ddc:330 ; club of clubs ; membership rights ; European Union ; quotas
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 5
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    München: ifo Institut - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München
    Publication Date: 2019-12-29
    Keywords: F34 ; G01 ; ddc:330 ; Finanzmarktkrise ; Geldpolitik ; EU-Stabilitätspakt ; Eurozone ; Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 6
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: Our experimental analysis of alliances in conflicts leads to three main findings. First, even in the absence of repeated interaction, direct contact or communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced than what would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this possible solidarity among 'brothers in arms' when fighting against an outside enemy may rapidly deteriorate or disappear as soon as the outside enemy disappears. Third, when fighting an outside enemy, 'brothers in arms' may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against the external enemy.
    Keywords: D72 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; alliance ; conflict ; contest ; free-riding ; hold-up problem ; solidarity ; Politischer Konflikt ; Internationale Zusammenarbeit ; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ; Solidarität ; Public Choice ; Theorie
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 7
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: What is the strategic role of membership in an intergovernmental group with unanimity requirements if the group negotiates with an external player in a setting with incomplete information? Being in such a group has a strategic effect compared to negotiating as a stand-alone player and reduces the demands of the outside player: being in a group lends additional bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this may harm also the intergovernmental group. We uncover the role of preference alignment and preference independence between members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis we also distinguishing between coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition group are not always perfectly aligned.
    Keywords: F51 ; F53 ; F59 ; ddc:330 ; bargaining ; incomplete information ; coalitions ; groups ; strategic bargaining power ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Koalition ; Verhandlungsmacht ; Unvollkommene Information ; Theorie
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 8
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Dortmund: Universität Dortmund, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
    Publication Date: 2018-12-07
    Description: We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts 'early' and a group of players who choose 'late'. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses 'late', whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost.
    Keywords: D72 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; Sequential all-pay auction ; complete information ; generalized cost ; generalized Stackelberg game
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 9
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: This paper develops a competition theory framework that evaluates an important aspect of the OECD's Harmful Tax Practices Initiative against tax havens. We show that the sequential nature of the process is harmful and more costly than a 'big bang' multilateral agreement. The sequentiality may even prevent the process from being completed successfully. Closing down a subset of tax havens reduces competition among the havens that remain active. This makes their 'tax haven business' more profitable and shifts a larger share of rents to these remaining tax havens, making them more reluctant to give up their 'tax haven business'. Moreover, the outcome of this process, reducing the number of tax havens, but not eliminating them altogether, may reduce welfare in the OECD.
    Keywords: F21 ; H26 ; H77 ; H87 ; ddc:330 ; tax haven ; harmful tax practices ; bidding for haven inactivation ; Steueroase ; Steuerwettbewerb ; Steuerpolitik ; OECD-Staaten-seitig ; Steuerflucht ; Kritik ; Welt ; OECD-Staaten
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 10
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: This paper studies corporate tax competition if it is costly to learn some of the elements that determine the effective tax burden. Search cost may, but need not, eliminate the tax competition pressure. The outcome depends on the boundaries of tax rate and tax base choices. Search cost can explain the empirically observed tax cuts cum base broadening.
    Keywords: H70 ; H87 ; ddc:330 ; costly search ; tax competition ; corporate taxation ; monopoly pricing paradox ; Unternehmensbesteuerung ; Steuerwettbewerb ; Steuerplanung ; Informationskosten ; Monopolistischer Wettbewerb ; Steuertarif ; Steuerbemessung ; Theorie
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...