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  • 1
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    Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2019-12-04
    Description: Some of the member states of the European Union sell citizenship or residence to wealthy foreign investors. We analyse these "golden-passport" programs as a study in the political economy of conflict and cooperation in an international meta-club. Seen through the lens of club goods theory, the EU is a club of nations, each of which can be interpreted as itself a club. Each single nation reserves the right to govern the admission of new individual members into its own club, and new members automatically benefit from the EU wide meta-club good. We characterize the unique equilibrium when individual clubs that may differ in membership size are free to choose the terms on which they admit members, and evaluate it from the point of view of the wellbeing of the set of clubs as a whole. We identify club size and benefits as well as differences in cost externalities as the key determinants. We also consider how the set of clubs as a whole can respond to the economic inefficiency problems such a situation creates.
    Keywords: F15 ; F53 ; H77 ; ddc:330 ; club of clubs ; membership rights ; European Union ; quotas
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
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    ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
    Publication Date: 2016-01-29
    Description: Learning that others earn more may reduce individual well-being but can also be informative about the own income prospects. This paper provides experimental evidence that separates direct effects of income comparisons on well-being and informational effects from observing changes in the income of others. In an environment of uncertainty about the own income we find that both the direct comparison effects and the informational effects are asymmetric. Individual beliefs about the own income are adjusted downwards when observing that others are likely to earn less but do not change significantly when observing that others are likely to earn more. Individual satisfaction decreases when observing that others are likely to earn more but does not change significantly when observing that others are likely to earn less. Overall, individuals are more reactive to bad news than to good news .
    Keywords: C91 ; D31 ; D84 ; ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:conferenceObject
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  • 3
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    ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
    Publication Date: 2016-01-29
    Description: We study the role of an imbalance in fighting strengths when players bargain in the shadow of conflict. Our experimental results suggest: In a simple bargaining game with an exogenous mediation proposal, the likelihood of conflict is independent of the balance of power. If bargaining involves endogenous demand choices, however, the likelihood of conflict is higher if power is more imbalanced. Even though endogenous bargaining outcomes reflect the players' unequal fighting strengths, strategic uncertainty causes outcomes to be most efficient when power is balanced. In turn, the importance of exogenous mediation proposals depends on the balance of power.
    Keywords: C78 ; D72 ; D74 ; ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:conferenceObject
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  • 4
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2017-11-11
    Description: Time is a crucial determinant of deception, since some misreporting opportunities come as a surprise and require an intuitive decision while others allow for extensive reflection time. To be able to pursue a deceptive strategy, however, a subject must be aware of the misreporting opportunity. This paper provides experimental evidence on the role of the time dimension for dishonest decision-making and for the cognition process of the chance to deceive. We conduct a laboratory experiment of self-serving deceptive behavior which combines two exogenously varied levels of reflection time with a cognition process about the deception opportunity. We find that time pressure leads to more honesty compared to sufficient contemplation time. More importantly, decomposing misreporting into its two components, i.e., the cognition process of the misreporting opportunity and the conscious decision to misreport, reveals that more reflection time increases awareness of the misreporting opportunity. However, more time has no effect on the conscious decision of whether to misreport or not. Due to subjects’ lack of awareness under time pressure we conclude that honesty is the intuitive response.
    Keywords: C91 ; D83 ; K42 ; ddc:330 ; time pressure ; awareness ; deception ; contemplation ; cognitive process ; laboratory experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 5
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-01-17
    Description: Tax havens differ in the specific tax planning arrangements multinational firms can use to reduce their tax liabilities. Given the complexity and cost associated with identifying the most effective tax haven to use, an accounting firm can act as an intermediary between tax havens and multinational corporations. We analyze a model with horizontally differentiated multinationals and tax havens to study the role accounting firm intermediation has on tax haven prices, multinational tax planning choices, accounting firm profits, and tax revenues. In equilibrium, uniform accounting firm fees generate higher accounting firm profit, less tax avoidance, and higher tax revenues than either full price discrimination or haven-specific fees.
    Keywords: M41 ; H26 ; H73 ; F38 ; ddc:330 ; tax haven ; accounting firm ; horizontal differentiation ; double marginalization ; fee-setting rules
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 6
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    Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
    Publication Date: 2016-06-22
    Description: This paper studies the effect of endogenous audit probabilities on reporting behavior in a face-to-face compliance situation such as at customs. In an experimental setting in which underreporting has a higher expected payoff than truthful reporting we find an increase in compliance of about 80% if subjects have reason to believe that their behavior towards an officer influences their endogenous audit probability. Higher compliance is driven by considerations about how own appearance and performance affect their audit probability, rather than by social and psychological effects of face-to-face contact.
    Keywords: H26 ; H31 ; C91 ; K42 ; ddc:330 ; compliance ; audit probability ; tax evasion ; face value ; customs
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 7
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2017-06-08
    Description: We consider campaign competition in which candidates compete for votes among a continuum of voters by engaging in persuasive efforts that are targetable. Each individual voter is persuaded by campaign effort and votes for the candidate who targets more persuasive effort to this voter. Each candidate chooses a level of total campaign effort and allocates their effort among the set of voters. We completely characterize equilibrium for the majoritarian objective game and compare that to the vote-share maximizing game. If the candidates are symmetric ex ante, both types of electoral competition dissipate the rents from office in expectation. However, the equilibria arising under the two electoral objectives qualitatively differ. In majoritarian elections, candidates randomize over their level of total campaign effort, which provides support for the puzzling phenomenon of the emergence of supermajorities in majoritarian systems. Vote-share maximization leads to an equilibrium in which both candidates make deterministic budget choices and reach a precise fifty-fifty split of vote shares. We also study how asymmetry between the candidates affects the equilibrium. If some share of the voters is loyal to one of the candidates, then both candidates expend the same expected efforts in equilibrium, but the advantaged candidate wins with higher probability for majoritarian voting or a higher share of voters for vote-share maximization.
    Keywords: D72 ; D78 ; D82 ; ddc:330 ; campaign competition ; continuous general lotto game ; vote buying ; flexible budgets ; supermajorities ; loyal voters
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 8
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    München: ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München
    Publication Date: 2019-06-26
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
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  • 9
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-27
    Description: In the context of international tax coordination incomplete information is one of the well-known frictions that can lead to bargaining failure and might explain a lack of observed coordination. We consider international negotiations about tax coordination under complete and incomplete information. We identify the conditions for multilateral negotiations to be more likely to be successful than gradual/sequential negotiation approaches and compare different routes of sequential bargaining. Under plausible conditions, full-scale global coordination is least likely to emerge if the negotiations take place sequentially, and if the negotiations with the most unpredictable country take place last.
    Keywords: H25 ; H77 ; F52 ; F55 ; ddc:330 ; tax competition ; tax cooperation ; multilateral negotiations ; sequential negotiations ; ultimatum bargaining ; acceptance uncertainty
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 10
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    München: ifo Institut - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München
    Publication Date: 2018-11-22
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
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