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  • Cambridge University Press  (83)
  • 1940-1944  (83)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    The @Cambridge law journal 8 (1943), S. 218-219 
    ISSN: 0008-1973
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Law
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    The @Cambridge law journal 7 (1941), S. 416-417 
    ISSN: 0008-1973
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Law
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 19 (1944), S. 261-275 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 19 (1944), S. 3-18 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Notes: You have invited me to speak about Morals without Faith. Briefly, I take it, this question means: is there any moral law for agnostics? But it might be more interesting to put it rather differently: to ask, not simply whether there is a moral law for those who do not believe in God, but whether there is any such law even for those who do independent of their belief? We are then asking: Does being under a moral law mean nothing more than being commanded by God? Is the only incentive for obeying it in our love or fear of Him, the only criterion by which to judge the morality of actions in their conformity to a revealed standard? Or would it be more true to say that the law which God wishes us to obey is that law to which we ought to conform because it corresponds to our nature and conditions in this world, a law which, apart from being God's will, we can understand as being indispensable to the kind of beings we are?
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 16 (1941), S. 214-215 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 16 (1941), S. 169-184 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Notes: The following discussion arises out of reflection upon a number of related topics. One of these is the problem of perception, and in particular of perceptual illusion. Another is the use which has been made, e.g. by Bradley, of the distinction between appearance and reality as a guiding principle of metaphysical inquiry. But the immediate occasion of the present inquiry is the attempt to discover what Kant in particular has to say upon these and similar problems. It is for this reason that I have given the paper its title, and not because I wish to pose as an expert in Kantian scholarship. What contribution I can make to Kantian studies is only that of the outsider whose questions may perhaps suggest to the experts lines of inquiry which their very familiarity with Kant's ways of expressing himself may have led them to overlook. But the aim of the paper is not so much to discover what Kant meant as to formulate a particular view which may have been Kant's in such a way that we can judge whether it is true or not. The decision on that point, however, falls outside the scope of the present discussion.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 15 (1940), S. 115-130 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Notes: At the present time Tribunals, appointed under an Act of Parliament, are engaged all over England in dealing with claims to exemption from military service based on the ground of “conscientious objection” to taking part directly or indirectly in warlike activities. Now it is no part of the professional business of moral philosophers to tell people what they ought or ought not to do or to exhort them to do their duty. Moral philosophers, as such, have no special information, not available to the general public, about what is right and what is wrong; nor have they any call to undertake those hortatory functions which are so adequately performed by clergymen, politicians, leader-writers, and wireless loudspeakers. But it is the function of a moral philosopher to reflect on the moral concepts and beliefs which he or others have; to try to analyse them and draw distinctions and clear up confusions in connection with them; and to see how they are inter-related and whether they can be arranged in a coherent system. Now there can be no doubt that the popular notions of “conscience” and “conscientious action” are extremely vague and confused. So I think that, by devoting this paper to an attempt to elucidate them, I may succeed in being topical without being impertinent.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 15 (1940), S. 177-189 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Notes: IN an earlier article I urged that the State presupposes an agreement to be governed on the part of its members. One common objection to this view was discussed at some length. It remains to deal with three further objections. (2) It will perhaps be urged that a particular individual, or a small minority, would not be able to withdraw from the State if they wished to do so. If anyone decided that he did not wish to have anything to do with the State, whether it be the State in general, or some particular State, he could not give effect to his decision. Compulsion, as exercised against such persons, cannot be said to rest in any sense on their own consent. To put the same point in another way, “The claim that government rests on consent would never be listened to by a magistrate.” 1
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 19 (1944), S. 159-161 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Philosophy 19 (1944), S. 173-174 
    ISSN: 0031-8191
    Source: Cambridge Journals Digital Archives
    Topics: Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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