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  • Dortmund: Universität Dortmund, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät  (2)
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    Dortmund: Universität Dortmund, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
    Publication Date: 2018-12-07
    Description: We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts 'early' and a group of players who choose 'late'. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses 'late', whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost.
    Keywords: D72 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; Sequential all-pay auction ; complete information ; generalized cost ; generalized Stackelberg game
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
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    Dortmund: Universität Dortmund, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
    Publication Date: 2018-12-07
    Description: In the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two groups of individual players who move sequentially, only the player with the lowest effort cost has a positive payoff. This payoff and the overall dissipation crucially depend on group composition.
    Keywords: D72 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; Sequential all-pay auction ; complete information ; generalized cost ; generalized Stackelberg game
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
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