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  • Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)  (30)
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  • 1
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2019-12-29
    Description: The future consequences of climate change are highly uncertain. Today, the exact size of possible future damages are widely unknown. Governments try to cope with these risks by investing in mitigation and adaptation measures. Mitigation aims at a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions whereas adaptation reduces the follow-up costs of climate change. In contrast to the existing literature, we explicitly model the decision of risk-averse governments on mitigation and adaptation policies. Furthermore we also consider the interaction of the two strategies. Mitigation efforts of a single country trigger crowding out as other countries will reduce their mitigation efforts. We show that, under fairly mild conditions, a unilateral increase in mitigation efforts of a single country can even increase global emissions. In contrast, a unilateral commitment to large adaptation efforts benefits the single country and may reduce the global risk from climate change at the expense of other countries.
    Keywords: Q54 ; Q58 ; ddc:330 ; climate change ; adaptation ; mitigation ; risk-taking ; Klimaveränderung ; Umweltpolitik ; Immissionsschutz ; Politische Entscheidung
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: Our experimental analysis of alliances in conflicts leads to three main findings. First, even in the absence of repeated interaction, direct contact or communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced than what would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this possible solidarity among 'brothers in arms' when fighting against an outside enemy may rapidly deteriorate or disappear as soon as the outside enemy disappears. Third, when fighting an outside enemy, 'brothers in arms' may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against the external enemy.
    Keywords: D72 ; D74 ; ddc:330 ; alliance ; conflict ; contest ; free-riding ; hold-up problem ; solidarity ; Politischer Konflikt ; Internationale Zusammenarbeit ; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ; Solidarität ; Public Choice ; Theorie
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 3
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: What is the strategic role of membership in an intergovernmental group with unanimity requirements if the group negotiates with an external player in a setting with incomplete information? Being in such a group has a strategic effect compared to negotiating as a stand-alone player and reduces the demands of the outside player: being in a group lends additional bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this may harm also the intergovernmental group. We uncover the role of preference alignment and preference independence between members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis we also distinguishing between coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition group are not always perfectly aligned.
    Keywords: F51 ; F53 ; F59 ; ddc:330 ; bargaining ; incomplete information ; coalitions ; groups ; strategic bargaining power ; Verhandlungstheorie ; Koalition ; Verhandlungsmacht ; Unvollkommene Information ; Theorie
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 4
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: This paper develops a competition theory framework that evaluates an important aspect of the OECD's Harmful Tax Practices Initiative against tax havens. We show that the sequential nature of the process is harmful and more costly than a 'big bang' multilateral agreement. The sequentiality may even prevent the process from being completed successfully. Closing down a subset of tax havens reduces competition among the havens that remain active. This makes their 'tax haven business' more profitable and shifts a larger share of rents to these remaining tax havens, making them more reluctant to give up their 'tax haven business'. Moreover, the outcome of this process, reducing the number of tax havens, but not eliminating them altogether, may reduce welfare in the OECD.
    Keywords: F21 ; H26 ; H77 ; H87 ; ddc:330 ; tax haven ; harmful tax practices ; bidding for haven inactivation ; Steueroase ; Steuerwettbewerb ; Steuerpolitik ; OECD-Staaten-seitig ; Steuerflucht ; Kritik ; Welt ; OECD-Staaten
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 5
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: This paper studies corporate tax competition if it is costly to learn some of the elements that determine the effective tax burden. Search cost may, but need not, eliminate the tax competition pressure. The outcome depends on the boundaries of tax rate and tax base choices. Search cost can explain the empirically observed tax cuts cum base broadening.
    Keywords: H70 ; H87 ; ddc:330 ; costly search ; tax competition ; corporate taxation ; monopoly pricing paradox ; Unternehmensbesteuerung ; Steuerwettbewerb ; Steuerplanung ; Informationskosten ; Monopolistischer Wettbewerb ; Steuertarif ; Steuerbemessung ; Theorie
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 6
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: This paper studies the role of beliefs about own performance or appearance for compliance at the customs. In an experiment in which underreporting has a higher expected payoff than truthful reporting we find: a large share, about 15-20 percent of the subjects, is more compliant if they have reason to imagine that their performance influences their subjective audit probability. In contrast, we do not find evidence for individuals who believe that by their personal performance they can reduce the subjective probability for an audit. Our results suggest that the power of imagination, i.e. the role of second-order beliefs in the process of customs declarations is important and may potentially be used to improve customs and tax compliance.
    Keywords: H26 ; H31 ; C91 ; ddc:330 ; customs ; tax compliance ; audit probability ; second-order beliefs ; Zoll ; Steuermoral ; Steuerfahndung ; Wahrnehmung ; Test ; Deutschland
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 7
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: This paper assesses the role of the public sector in adaptation to climate change. We first offer a definition and categorisation of climate change adaptation. We then consider the primary economic principles that can guide the assignment of adaptation tasks to either the private or the public sector, as well as those guiding assignment within the public sector itself. We find that the role of the state in adaptation policy is limited. We identify information policy, the provision of a suitable regulatory framework in some markets, the formation of human capital and policies that foster economic growth and technological and medical knowledge as the main areas in which the public sector has a role in climate change adaptation.
    Keywords: H54 ; Q54 ; Q58 ; ddc:330 ; climate change ; adaptation ; Schelling conjecture ; subsidiarity ; Klimaveränderung ; Wirtschaftliche Anpassung ; Staatliche Einflussnahme
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 8
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: If countries anticipate Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes some of their tax payers less mobile or increases the mobility of tax payers elsewhere. I provide piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use. I analyse how such activities interact with Bertrand tax competition if the size of the group of loyal and non-loyal citizens or investors is endogenous. Further I consider the implications of tax harmonization and minimum taxes for these types of non-price competition. Home attachment reduces the intensity of tax competition, but generates a strategic disadvantage for the country that invests much in such home attachment. Harmonization of taxes and high minimum taxes can intensify countries' investment in home attachment.
    Keywords: H77 ; F21 ; F22 ; ddc:330 ; tax competition ; common pool ; advertizing ; nation brands ; instilling preferences ; home bias ; patriotism ; Steuerwettbewerb ; Duopol ; Internationale Arbeitsmobilität ; Steuerharmonisierung ; Optimale Besteuerung ; Zwei-Länder-Modell ; Theorie
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 9
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2015-05-22
    Description: Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest st ructure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Contests ; merger
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 10
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2016-10-07
    Description: Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare-improving even if costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to reconcile theory with various empirical findings, is the assumption that information about output decisions flows more freely within a merged firm.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Merger ; internal organizational structure ; information ; timing ; market structure
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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