WILBERT

Wildauer Bücher+E-Medien Recherche-Tool

feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    Göttingen: VHB - Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft, German Academic Association of Business Research
    Publication Date: 2014-11-15
    Description: In this paper I consider the impact of a noisy indicator regarding a manager’s manipulative behavior on optimal effort incentives and the extent of earnings management. The analysis in this paper extends a twotask, single performance measure LEN model by including a binary random variable. I show that contracting on the noisy indicator variable is not always useful. More specifically, the principal uses the indicator variable to prevent earnings management only under conditions where manipulative behavior is not excessive. Thus, under conditions of excessive earnings management, accounting adjustments that yield a more congruent overall performance measure can be more effective than an appraisal of the existence of earnings management to mitigate the earnings management problem.
    Keywords: ddc:650 ; accounting ; Gewinnverwendung ; Anreizvertrag ; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie ; Performance-Messung ; Operations Research
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...