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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Wiesbaden : Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
    Keywords: Datenverarbeitung ; Informatik ; Wirtschaft ; Computer science ; Information technology ; Business ; Computer simulation ; Computer Science ; Simulation and Modeling ; IT in Business ; Professional Computing
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (XVII, 240 S. 72 Abb., 33 Abb. in Farbe)
    ISBN: 9783658172978
    Series Statement: Angewandte Wirtschaftsinformatik
    DDC: 003.3
    Language: German
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Wiesbaden : Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (XVI, 245 Seiten 64 Abb)
    ISBN: 9783658120108 , 9783658120092
    Series Statement: Angewandte Wirtschaftsinformatik
    DDC: 005.1
    Language: German
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  • 3
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    Unknown
    München: Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
    Publication Date: 2014-03-22
    Description: This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian Motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the highest stopping point wins. Contrary to the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition, here, higher stopping times are riskier, because players can go bankrupt. We derive a closed-form solution of the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the game. In equilibrium, the trade-off between risk and reward causes a non-monotonicity: highest expected losses occur if the process decreases only slightly in expectation.
    Keywords: C72 ; C73 ; D81 ; ddc:330 ; Discontinuous games ; Contests ; Relative performance pay ; Risktaking behavior ; Entscheidung bei Risiko ; Glücksspiel ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Test
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 4
    facet.materialart.
    Unknown
    München: Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
    Publication Date: 2014-03-22
    Description: This paper introduces a contest model in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. Applications of the model include procurement contests and competitions for grants. We prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium outcome, even if players have to choose bounded stopping times. We derive the equilibrium distribution in closed form. If the noise vanishes, the equilibrium outcome converges to - and thus selects - the symmetric equilibrium outcome of an all-pay auction. For two players and constant costs, each player's profits increase if costs for both players increase, variance increases, or drift decreases. Intuitively, patience becomes a more important factor for contest success, which reduces informational rents.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Contests ; all-pay contests ; silent timing games ; Entscheidung bei Risiko ; Glücksspiel ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Zeitökonomie ; Theorie
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
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