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  • 1
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Wiesbaden : Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden | Wiesbaden : Springer Vieweg
    Keywords: Hochschule ; Computers ; Information technology ; Business—Data processing ; Learning ; Instruction ; Educational technology ; Information Systems and Communication Service ; IT in Business ; Learning & Instruction ; Technology and Digital Education ; Hochschule
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (XXIV, 310 Seiten 98 Abb., 83 Abb. in Farbe)
    ISBN: 9783658266189
    Series Statement: Angewandte Wirtschaftsinformatik
    DDC: 005.7
    Language: German
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  • 2
    Online Resource
    Online Resource
    Wiesbaden : Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
    Keywords: Unternehmen ; Digitalisierung ; Industrie 4.0 ; Information systems ; Information technology ; Information Systems and Communication Service ; IT in Business ; Unternehmen ; Digitalisierung ; Industrie 4.0 ca. Ende 20. Jahrhundert
    Type of Medium: Online Resource
    Pages: 1 Online-Ressource (XX, 305 Seiten 91 Abb)
    ISBN: 9783658227739
    Series Statement: Angewandte Wirtschaftsinformatik
    DDC: 005.7
    RVK:
    RVK:
    Language: German
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  • 3
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    Kiel und Hamburg: ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
    Publication Date: 2015-05-08
    Description: This paper introduces a class of contest models in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. We prove existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium outcome and derive the equilibrium distribution in closed form. As the variance tends to zero, the equilibrium outcome converges to the symmetric equilibrium of an all-pay auction. For two players and constant costs, each player's equilibrium pro fit decreases if the drift increases, the variance decreases, or the costs increase.
    Keywords: C72 ; C73 ; D44 ; ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:conferenceObject
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  • 4
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    Kiel und Hamburg: ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
    Publication Date: 2015-02-17
    Description: This paper analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction. I derive the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome for a large class of cumulative distribution functions over head starts. In equilibrium, the stronger player generates an informational rent if and only if his head start distribution is not stochastically dominated by a uniform distribution. This result introduces a new perspective on lobbying contests and procurement contests.
    Keywords: C72 ; C73 ; D72 ; ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:conferenceObject
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  • 5
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    Unknown
    München: Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
    Publication Date: 2020-05-19
    Description: This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian Motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the highest stopping point wins. Contrary to the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition, here, higher stopping times are riskier, because players can go bankrupt. We derive a closed-form solution of the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the game. In equilibrium, the trade-off between risk and reward causes a non-monotonicity: highest expected losses occur if the process decreases only slightly in expectation.
    Keywords: C72 ; C73 ; D81 ; ddc:330 ; Discontinuous games ; Contests ; Relative performance pay ; Risktaking behavior ; Entscheidung bei Risiko ; Glücksspiel ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Test
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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