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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Kyklos 46 (1993), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1467-6435
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of economic design 3 (1997), S. 29-43 
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: Key words: Voluntary provision of public goods, Stackelberg games JEL classification: H 41
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good. The Stackelberg leader is willing to accept such transfers if the actual contribution game is fully non-cooperative because the transfer generates a Pareto superior outcome. If the contributions in the Stackelberg equilibrium is the threat point of a possible cooperative Nash bargaining game, the Stackelberg leader will refuse to accept the transfer if she can.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of economics 57 (1993), S. 95-101 
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper extends results on the consistency of two-moment decision models with expected utility to rank-dependent utility preferences. The representations of expected utility and rank-dependent utility by μ-σ-preferences have very similar comparative statics properties for linear distribution classes, except for the behavior with respect to small independent risks.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of economics 60 (1994), S. 299-321 
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Reductions of environmentally harmful emissions are often a public good in a global context. For strategic reasons, countries may adopt a technology with high per unit cost of emission reduction, even if a technology with lower per unit cost is available at no extra cost. They thereby credibly commit themselves to not reducing emission much in the future. In a game of private voluntary provision of emission reduction, this commitment will make other countries increase their emission reductions. Also, in the case where countries cooperate in the future, such commitment gives a country a strategic advantage, because it shifts the disagreement point in a favorable direction.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Kyklos 43 (1990), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1467-6435
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Limitation Availability
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Economics & politics 7 (1995), S. 0 
    ISSN: 1468-0343
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Political Science
    Notes: A firm which lobbies government for a change in policy, say an import tariff, can increase its profits in two ways. First, the policy can increase the profits of all firms in the industry. This effect therefore involves a free-rider problem. Second, a firm's lobbying expenditures may signal other firms about its costs and interests. For example, a firm with low marginal costs may profit much from an import ban. Other firms which see that this firm expects to profit much from the ban may decide not to enter the industry. This may further increase the low-cost firm's profits.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of population economics 8 (1995), S. 315-326 
    ISSN: 1432-1475
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper explains public provision of social capital in an overlapping generations model with ‘gerontocracy’, without resort to any bequest motive. The old generation has an incentive to provide education and infrastructure because these goods shift the Laffer curve of social security taxation, thereby increasing old-age income in the political equilibrium. The incentive is stronger if population growth is larger. The marginal productivity of social capital in the political equilibrium may exceed or fall short of the marginal productivity of social capital in an efficient allocation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 16 (1991), S. 167-177 
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: Risk Taking ; Taxation ; Complete Conventional Securities Markets
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In general equilibrium, with complete conventional securities markets and endogenous asset supply, taxes on risk remuneration are ineffective but harmless. They do not alter the real allocation of goods or the distribution of wealth, they impose no excess burden, and, in particular, have no impact on risk taking.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    The Geneva risk and insurance review 18 (1993), S. 131-146 
    ISSN: 1554-9658
    Keywords: Self-Insurance ; Self-Protection ; Rank-Dependent Utility ; Limited Liability
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper studies the comparative statics of self-insurance and self-protection for individuals with rank-dependent expected utility preferences. In particular, proportional wealth risks, background risk, and limited liability are considered. Limited liability has a major impact on self-insurance and self-protection. It can reverse seemingly robust comparative static results for the case of self-insurance and can eliminate some puzzling ambiguities for the case of self-protection.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 80 (1994), S. 55-68 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Supply restricting drug policy is inefficient from an economic point of view, but is nevertheless widely used. This paper explains this phenomenon as individually rational behavior for local government. Because supply restriction gives addicts an incentive to migrate it has an external effect. This effect makes a policy of supply restrictions individually rational but leads to socially wasteful competition between local governments in a federal system.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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