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  • 1
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    München: Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
    Publication Date: 2014-03-22
    Description: This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian Motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the highest stopping point wins. Contrary to the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition, here, higher stopping times are riskier, because players can go bankrupt. We derive a closed-form solution of the unique Nash equilibrium outcome of the game. In equilibrium, the trade-off between risk and reward causes a non-monotonicity: highest expected losses occur if the process decreases only slightly in expectation.
    Keywords: C72 ; C73 ; D81 ; ddc:330 ; Discontinuous games ; Contests ; Relative performance pay ; Risktaking behavior ; Entscheidung bei Risiko ; Glücksspiel ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Test
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 2
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    München: Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
    Publication Date: 2014-03-22
    Description: This paper introduces a contest model in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. Applications of the model include procurement contests and competitions for grants. We prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium outcome, even if players have to choose bounded stopping times. We derive the equilibrium distribution in closed form. If the noise vanishes, the equilibrium outcome converges to - and thus selects - the symmetric equilibrium outcome of an all-pay auction. For two players and constant costs, each player's profits increase if costs for both players increase, variance increases, or drift decreases. Intuitively, patience becomes a more important factor for contest success, which reduces informational rents.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Contests ; all-pay contests ; silent timing games ; Entscheidung bei Risiko ; Glücksspiel ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Zeitökonomie ; Theorie
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 3
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    Kiel und Hamburg: ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
    Publication Date: 2015-05-08
    Description: This paper introduces a class of contest models in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. We prove existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium outcome and derive the equilibrium distribution in closed form. As the variance tends to zero, the equilibrium outcome converges to the symmetric equilibrium of an all-pay auction. For two players and constant costs, each player's equilibrium pro fit decreases if the drift increases, the variance decreases, or the costs increase.
    Keywords: C72 ; C73 ; D44 ; ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:conferenceObject
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  • 4
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    Kiel und Hamburg: ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
    Publication Date: 2015-02-17
    Description: This paper analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction. I derive the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome for a large class of cumulative distribution functions over head starts. In equilibrium, the stronger player generates an informational rent if and only if his head start distribution is not stochastically dominated by a uniform distribution. This result introduces a new perspective on lobbying contests and procurement contests.
    Keywords: C72 ; C73 ; D72 ; ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:conferenceObject
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  • 5
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    Milano: Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-15
    Description: We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set. The myopic stable set is defined for a very general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. We show that the myopic stable set exists and is non-empty. Under minor continuity conditions, we also demonstrate uniqueness. Furthermore, the myopic stable set is a superset of the core and of the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in noncooperative games. Additionally, the myopic stable set generalizes and unifies various results from more specific environments. In particular, the myopic stable set coincides with the coalition structure core in coalition function form games if the coalition structure core is non-empty; with the set of stable matchings in the standard one-to-one matching model; with the set of pairwise stable networks and closed cycles in models of network formation; and with the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite supermodular games, finite potential games, and aggregative games. We illustrate the versatility of our concept by characterizing the myopic stable set in a model of Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs, for which the literature so far has not been able to fully characterize the set of all (mixed) Nash equilibria.
    Keywords: C70 ; C71 ; ddc:330 ; Social Environments ; Group Formation ; Stability ; Nash Equilibrium
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 6
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    Publication Date: 2019-03-08
    Description: Der Titel unseres Tagungsbands „Prozesse, Technologie, Anwendungen, Systeme und Management 2015“ unterstreicht erneut die fachliche Breite der Beiträge der forschenden Kollegen an Fachhochschulen. Im Rahmen eines zweistufigen Begutachtungsverfahrens – zunächst wurde von den Mitgliedern des Programmkomitees ein Abstract begutachtet und danach der vollständige Beitrag – wurden die vorliegenden 31 Beiträge für die Tagung ausgewählt. Diese hohe Zahl an Beiträgen widerspiegelt den großen Aufwand, den unsere Kollegen zusätzlich zu ihren Lehrdeputaten in die Forschung investieren. Zugleich erforderte sie auf Grund der limitierten Seitenzahl des Tagungsbandes da und dort Kürzungen, welche den Autorinnen und Autoren sicherlich nicht immer leicht fielen. Ungekürzte Versionen der Beiträge können auch jederzeit in unserem online Journal (http://ojs.hslu.ch/index.php/AKWI) eingereicht werden. Wir haben die Beiträge wiederum in drei Tracks angeordnet, welche zugleich die Überschriften der Abschnitte des Tagungsbandes bilden. Der Track „Geschäftsprozesse" hat die Schwerpunkte „Modellierung und Simulation von Geschäftsprozessen" sowie „Referenz-und Reifegradmodelle". Der Track „Management und IT-Systeme" liefert interessante Einblicke u.a. in die Themen Digitalisierung, Akzeptanz von IT-Systemen, agile Methoden, Nutzenanalyse einer In-Memory Datenbank im Umfeld Business Intelligence, Einführung von ERP-Systemen auch in KMU, Datenqualität und modellgetriebene Softwareentwicklung. Cloud-Lösungen von Standardsoftwareherstellern, Mobilität, virtuelle Labore, Private Cloud, Sicherheit und mobile Applikationen sind die Themen im Track „Cloud – Mobile – Security“. Die Reihenfolge der Beiträge innerhalb der Tracks (und damit der Kapitel des Tagungsbandes) folgt keinem speziellen Aufbau, sondern den planungstechnischen Randbedingungen. Zu letzteren gehört auch die Tatsache, dass dieses Jahr erfreulicherweise zum ersten Mal ein Doktorandenkolloquium in die wissenschaftliche Fachtagung integriert werden konnte. Herrn Prof. Dr. Christian Seel sei an dieser Stelle noch einmal ganz herzlich dafür gedankt. Trotz ihrer Kürze weisen alle vorliegenden Beiträge ein hohes Niveau auf und belegen das große Engagement der Kolleginnen und Kollegen, die sich im Arbeitskreis Wirtschaftsinformatik an Fachhochschulen (AKWI) zusammengefunden haben. Die Herausgeber danken allen Autorinnen und Autoren für die eingereichten Beiträge und der gastgebenden Hochschule Luzern für die zur Verfügung gestellten Räumlichkeiten im Zentrum von Luzern und die Unterstützung des Drucks unseres Tagungsbandes.
    Keywords: ddc:000
    Language: German
    Type: conferenceobject , doc-type:conferenceobject
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  • 7
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    Publication Date: 2019-03-08
    Description: Tagungsbeiträge aus den Bereichen Geschäftsprozesse, Informationssysteme – IT-Management, Cloud – Mobile – Security und Didaktik – Wissensmanagement
    Keywords: ddc:000
    Language: German
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  • 8
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    Publication Date: 2019-09-02
    Description: Tagungsbeiträge aus den Bereichen Informationssysteme – IT-Management, Geschäftsprozesse, Datenmanagement – Softwareengineering, Cloud – Mobile – Security, Wissensmanagement – Wissenstransfer, Didaktik und Industrie 4.0
    Keywords: ddc:000
    Language: German
    Type: conferenceobject , doc-type:conferenceobject
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  • 9
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    Publication Date: 2019-09-02
    Description: Tagungsbeiträge aus den Bereichen Wirtschaftsinformatik in Gesellschaft und Hochschule, Wirtschaftsinformatik im Unternehmen sowie Anwendungen und Systeme.
    Keywords: ddc:000
    Language: German
    Type: conferenceobject , doc-type:conferenceobject
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  • 10
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    Publication Date: 2020-01-10
    Description: Tagungsbeiträge aus den Bereichen Projektmanagement, Didaktik in der Wirtschaftsinformatik, IT-Sicherheit, Anwendungsfälle, Reifegradmodelle, Plattformen für Geschäftsprozesse und Prototypen.
    Keywords: ddc:000
    Language: German
    Type: conferenceobject , doc-type:conferenceobject
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