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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bradford : Emerald
    Journal of managerial psychology 15 (2000), S. 655-667 
    ISSN: 0268-3946
    Source: Emerald Fulltext Archive Database 1994-2005
    Topics: Psychology , Economics
    Notes: A self-serving bias occurs when people subconsciously alter their perceptions about what is fair or right in a manner that serves their own interests. Perceptions of what constitutes "fair performance" may well vary according to one's role in the employment relationship. While it is clear that employee satisfaction affects job performance, and that wage affects employee satisfaction, it is not only wage per se that determines morale, but also the perceived fairness of the received wage. Evidence from a laboratory experiment indicates these views differ significantly between participant "employers" and "employees." We compare choices (hypothetical in the case of employers) for the amount of costly "effort" to provide in response to a wage that has been determined outside the employment relationship. In the field, managers must be aware of the relationship between fairness in compensation and employee morale, as well as their own biases regarding the fairness reference point.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Experimental economics 2 (2000), S. 227-238 
    ISSN: 1573-6938
    Keywords: experiments ; cooperation ; strategy method
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our “hot” treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our “cold” treatment we follow the “strategy method” and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others' actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects' preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Experimental economics 2 (2000), S. 227-238 
    ISSN: 1573-6938
    Keywords: experiments ; cooperation ; strategy method ; C92
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyze whether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions depend on the elicitation procedure. In our “hot” treatment the second player responds to the first player's observed action while in our “cold” treatment we follow the “strategy method” and have the second player decide on a contingent action for each and every possible first player move, without first observing this move. Our analysis centers on the degree to which subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniary rewards, as a response to others' actions. Our results show no difference in behavior between the two treatments. We also find evidence of the stability of subjects' preferences with respect to their behavior over time and to the consistency of their choices as first and second mover.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We conduct an experimental study of sales of insider information about an asset's future value, where the insiders cannot purchase the underlying asset. We examine whether such information is purchased, the quality of the information provided, and the subsequent accuracy of purchase decisions in the underlying asset market. Our design explores whether reputation, in a repeated game of finite (but uncertain) duration, is an effective constraint on deliberate strategic misinformation. The insiders have an immediate incentive to state that the asset value is high when its true value is low. We suggest an application to insider trading in financial information markets. With fixed matching, cooperative outcomes featuring truthful revelation are frequently achieved and sustained, even though this suggests subjects have sophisticated beliefs about the beliefs and behavior of others. As a comparison, we also conduct a control treatment with random rematching. Here, information purchase is less frequent, the rate of truthful revelation decreases, and efficiency is diminished. Our results suggest that most people anticipate that others realize the potential value of a good reputation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
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    Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2019-09-04
    Description: The effectiveness of social interaction depends strongly on an ability to coordinate actions efficiently. In large networks, such coordination may be very difficult to achieve and may depend on the communication technology and the network structure. We examine how pre-play communication and clustering within networks affect coordination in a challenging experimental game on eight-person networks. Free-form chat is enormously effective in achieving the nonequilibrium efficient outcome in our game, but restricted communication (where subjects can only indicate their intended action) is almost entirely ineffective. We can rationalize this result with a novel model about the credibility of cheap-talk messages. This credibility is much larger with freeform message communication than with restricted communication. We are the first to model this credibility and show, both theoretically and experimentally, an interaction effect of network structure and communication technologies. We also provide a model of message diffusion, which indeed predicts that diffusion will be more rapid without clustering and is consistent with our data.
    Keywords: C71 ; C91 ; D03 ; D85 ; ddc:330 ; networks ; clustering ; communication ; credibility ; cheap talk ; experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 6
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    Unknown
    Bonn: Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2019-09-04
    Description: We consider the external validity of laboratory measures of risk attitude. Based on a large-scale experiment using a representative panel of the Dutch population, we test if these measures can explain two different types of behavior: (i) behavior in laboratory risky financial decisions, and (ii) behavior in naturally-occurring field behavior under risk (financial, health and employment decisions). We find that measures of risk attitude are related to behavior in laboratory financial decisions and the most complex measures are outperformed by simpler measures. However, measures of risk attitude are not related to risk-taking in the field, calling into question the methods currently used for the purpose of measuring actual risk preferences. We conclude that while the external validity of measures of risk attitude holds in closely related frameworks, this validity is compromised in more remote settings.
    Keywords: C91 ; C93 ; D81 ; ddc:330 ; lab-in-the-field experiment ; elicitation methods ; risk preferences
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 7
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    Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-15
    Description: This article examines whether social comparisons have behavioral effects on workers' performance when a firm can choose workers' wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect workers' performance. Moreover, the relative effect of discrimination in relation to decision rights is larger than in relation to wage. We find these treatment effects with both stated effort and a real-effort task, suggesting that both approaches may yield similar results.
    Keywords: C91 ; ddc:330 ; delegation ; gift-exchange ; experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 8
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    Unknown
    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-19
    Description: We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency and effectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent and lead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts are much more frequent and considerably more productive, both for buyers and sellers. Also, both buyer and seller earn considerably more from flexible with communication than rigid without communication. Our results show quite strongly that communication, a normal feature in contracting, can remove the potential cost of flexibility (disagreements caused by conflicting perceptions). We offer an explanation based on social norms.
    Keywords: C91 ; ddc:330 ; contract design ; communication ; experiments ; Vertrag ; Kommunikation ; Test
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 9
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    Stockholm: Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
    Publication Date: 2019-01-24
    Description: We report the results of a randomized controlled trial testing whether incentivizing physical exercise improves the academic performance of college students. As expected, the intervention increases physical activity. The main result is that it generates a strong and significant improvement in academic performance, particularly for students who struggled at the baseline in terms of lifestyle habits. We also provide evidence on the underlying mechanisms: Students who were incentivized to exercise have a healthier life style and improved self-control. Overall, the study demonstrates that incentivizing students to exercise can be an important tool in improving educational achievements.
    Keywords: C93 ; I12 ; I18 ; I21 ; Z20 ; ddc:330 ; Economics of education ; Human capital formation ; Behavior change ; Field experiment ; Sport ; Bildungsniveau ; Studierende ; Experiment ; Norwegen
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 10
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    Unknown
    Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
    Publication Date: 2015-05-22
    Description: The population of most developed societies is 'graying'. As life expectancy increases and the large baby-boom generation approaches retirement age, this has critical consequences for maintaining a high standard of living and the sustainability of pension systems. In the light of these labor-force and social concerns, we consider experimentally the comparative behavior of juniors (under 30) and seniors (over 50) in both experiments conducted onsite with the employees of two large firms and in a conventional laboratory environment with students and retirees. Our results are compelling. First, seniors are not more risk-averse, as opposed to the conventional stereotype. Second, both juniors and seniors react to the competitiveness of the environment and there is no significant difference in performance in the real-effort task across the generations when they are competing. Third, seniors are typically more cooperative than juniors in a team-production game. Cooperation is highest in groups in which there is a mix of juniors and seniors, suggesting that there are indeed benefits in maintaining a work force with diversity in age. Overall, the implication is that it is beneficial to define additional short-term incentives near the end of the workers' career to motivate and to retain older workers. A secondary, but important, issue is the external validity of conventional laboratory experiments. In general we do not find strong differences in behavior between workers and non-workers, indicating that laboratory experiments may not be such a bad approximation for the field environment.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; Gruppenentscheidung ; Altersgruppe ; Kooperation ; Wettbewerb ; Risikopräferenz ; Arbeitsmarktdiskriminierung ; Alternde Bevölkerung ; Test ; Feldforschung ; Frankreich
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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