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  • 1
    E-Resource
    E-Resource
    Berlin ; Heidelberg : Springer ; Volume 1-
    Associated volumes
    Keywords: Monografische Reihe
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    ISSN: 2196-002X
    Language: English
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 80 (1994), S. 55-68 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Supply restricting drug policy is inefficient from an economic point of view, but is nevertheless widely used. This paper explains this phenomenon as individually rational behavior for local government. Because supply restriction gives addicts an incentive to migrate it has an external effect. This effect makes a policy of supply restrictions individually rational but leads to socially wasteful competition between local governments in a federal system.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of economics 60 (1994), S. 299-321 
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Reductions of environmentally harmful emissions are often a public good in a global context. For strategic reasons, countries may adopt a technology with high per unit cost of emission reduction, even if a technology with lower per unit cost is available at no extra cost. They thereby credibly commit themselves to not reducing emission much in the future. In a game of private voluntary provision of emission reduction, this commitment will make other countries increase their emission reductions. Also, in the case where countries cooperate in the future, such commitment gives a country a strategic advantage, because it shifts the disagreement point in a favorable direction.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economics of governance 1 (2000), S. 1-2 
    ISSN: 1435-8131
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of economic design 3 (1997), S. 29-43 
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: Key words: Voluntary provision of public goods, Stackelberg games JEL classification: H 41
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good. The Stackelberg leader is willing to accept such transfers if the actual contribution game is fully non-cooperative because the transfer generates a Pareto superior outcome. If the contributions in the Stackelberg equilibrium is the threat point of a possible cooperative Nash bargaining game, the Stackelberg leader will refuse to accept the transfer if she can.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2017-11-11
    Description: Time is a crucial determinant of deception, since some misreporting opportunities come as a surprise and require an intuitive decision while others allow for extensive reflection time. To be able to pursue a deceptive strategy, however, a subject must be aware of the misreporting opportunity. This paper provides experimental evidence on the role of the time dimension for dishonest decision-making and for the cognition process of the chance to deceive. We conduct a laboratory experiment of self-serving deceptive behavior which combines two exogenously varied levels of reflection time with a cognition process about the deception opportunity. We find that time pressure leads to more honesty compared to sufficient contemplation time. More importantly, decomposing misreporting into its two components, i.e., the cognition process of the misreporting opportunity and the conscious decision to misreport, reveals that more reflection time increases awareness of the misreporting opportunity. However, more time has no effect on the conscious decision of whether to misreport or not. Due to subjects’ lack of awareness under time pressure we conclude that honesty is the intuitive response.
    Keywords: C91 ; D83 ; K42 ; ddc:330 ; time pressure ; awareness ; deception ; contemplation ; cognitive process ; laboratory experiment
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 7
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    Unknown
    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-01-17
    Description: Tax havens differ in the specific tax planning arrangements multinational firms can use to reduce their tax liabilities. Given the complexity and cost associated with identifying the most effective tax haven to use, an accounting firm can act as an intermediary between tax havens and multinational corporations. We analyze a model with horizontally differentiated multinationals and tax havens to study the role accounting firm intermediation has on tax haven prices, multinational tax planning choices, accounting firm profits, and tax revenues. In equilibrium, uniform accounting firm fees generate higher accounting firm profit, less tax avoidance, and higher tax revenues than either full price discrimination or haven-specific fees.
    Keywords: M41 ; H26 ; H73 ; F38 ; ddc:330 ; tax haven ; accounting firm ; horizontal differentiation ; double marginalization ; fee-setting rules
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 8
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    Unknown
    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2018-11-27
    Description: In the context of international tax coordination incomplete information is one of the well-known frictions that can lead to bargaining failure and might explain a lack of observed coordination. We consider international negotiations about tax coordination under complete and incomplete information. We identify the conditions for multilateral negotiations to be more likely to be successful than gradual/sequential negotiation approaches and compare different routes of sequential bargaining. Under plausible conditions, full-scale global coordination is least likely to emerge if the negotiations take place sequentially, and if the negotiations with the most unpredictable country take place last.
    Keywords: H25 ; H77 ; F52 ; F55 ; ddc:330 ; tax competition ; tax cooperation ; multilateral negotiations ; sequential negotiations ; ultimatum bargaining ; acceptance uncertainty
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 9
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    Munich: Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
    Publication Date: 2019-12-29
    Description: The future consequences of climate change are highly uncertain. Today, the exact size of possible future damages are widely unknown. Governments try to cope with these risks by investing in mitigation and adaptation measures. Mitigation aims at a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions whereas adaptation reduces the follow-up costs of climate change. In contrast to the existing literature, we explicitly model the decision of risk-averse governments on mitigation and adaptation policies. Furthermore we also consider the interaction of the two strategies. Mitigation efforts of a single country trigger crowding out as other countries will reduce their mitigation efforts. We show that, under fairly mild conditions, a unilateral increase in mitigation efforts of a single country can even increase global emissions. In contrast, a unilateral commitment to large adaptation efforts benefits the single country and may reduce the global risk from climate change at the expense of other countries.
    Keywords: Q54 ; Q58 ; ddc:330 ; climate change ; adaptation ; mitigation ; risk-taking ; Klimaveränderung ; Umweltpolitik ; Immissionsschutz ; Politische Entscheidung
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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  • 10
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    Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications
    Publication Date: 2020-01-15
    Description: What is the strategic role of membership in an intergovernmental group with unanimity requirements if the group negotiates with an external player in a setting with incomplete information? Being in such a group has a strategic effect compared to negotiating as a stand-alone player and reduces the demands of the outside player. Group membership lends additional bargaining power. Negotiating as a group may also cause more inefficiencies due to bargaining failure, and this may harm also the intergovernmental group. We uncover the role of preference alignment and preference independence between members of the coalition group for equilibrium payoffs and welfare effects. In this analysis, we also distinguish between coalition groups with and without side payments. Overall, coalition groups tend to perform well for the members of the coalition group in comparison to fully decentralized negotiations, particularly if the objectives of the members of the coalition group are not always perfectly aligned.
    Description: Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
    Keywords: ddc:330 ; bargaining ; incomplete information ; coalitions ; groups ; strategic bargaining power
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:article
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