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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economics of governance 1 (2000), S. 25-51 
    ISSN: 1435-8131
    Keywords: Key words:Rule-of-law, dictator, institutions, evolution, voting, cooperation ; JEL classification:P16
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. Using property-rights tools, this paper develops a theory of the transition from despotic to rule-of-law regimes, relying on the notion that rulers and subjects are interested in maximizing wealth. Keeping subjects in check enhances despots' internal security, but at the cost of lower output, and of less wealth for the despots. Enhanced wealth is especially valuable for protection against outside threat. Subjects will increase output only if provided with rights to, for example, ownership, movement, and voting. Despots can guarantee them these rights by relinquishing some of their own power.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economics of governance 1 (2000), S. 77-103 
    ISSN: 1435-8131
    Keywords: Key words:Revolution, information, technology, Europe, game theory ; JEL classification:N43, N44
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. Between 950 and 1950, European states experienced four short intervals of rapid social, political and economic change. Each such period followed the introduction of a macroinvention in information and communication technology. Here these two sets of events are linked by a rational theory of revolution in which the optimal system for producing the information to allocate a society's resources depends on the relative importance of fixed costs and network effects. Variations in these parameters can trigger four types of revolution –contractual, consensual, preemptive and prescriptive– each of which captures the essential features of one of the historical periods of change.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economics of governance 1 (2000), S. 53-76 
    ISSN: 1435-8131
    Keywords: Key words:Inflation targets, establishing credibility, precision of inflation control ; JEL classification:E5, E63
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. This paper develops a simple intertemporal model of inflation targets within a framework in which the public is uncertain about the dependability of policymakers, and in which policymakers do not perfectly control inflation. The framework is used to evaluate the effects of various parameters like the rate of time preference, initial reputation, and transparency (or precision of inflation control) on planned inflation, announced targets and the evolution of reputation and of inflationary expectations. The paper also shows that, when allowed to choose the precision of inflation control, more dependable policymakers will often choose relatively more precise control procedures. Implications for the type of inflation stabilization (cold turkey or gradual) chosen by dependable policymakers are also derived.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economics of governance 1 (2000), S. 105-122 
    ISSN: 1435-8131
    Keywords: JEL Classification:H30, H72, H73 ; Key words:Federalism, Distributive Politics, Strategic Voting, Decentralization, Local Public Goods
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. We analyze federal systems of government in which local public policies are financed by general taxation. In a decentralized political system there is, in each region, a vote to elect a local representative while in a centralized political system a single representative is elected by a federal vote. It is shown that under decentralization, voters strategically elect liberal representatives so as to nullify any element of cooperation between representatives in the decision-making stage. Thus, there is a trade-off between the budgetary externality and a “policy closer to the people”, but the democratic choice is biased towards decentralization.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economics of governance 1 (2000), S. 1-2 
    ISSN: 1435-8131
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economics of governance 1 (2000), S. 3-11 
    ISSN: 1435-8131
    Keywords: Key words:Political economy, state, ruling elite, credibility, economic policy ; JEL classification:D78
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. This paper addresses the following question: Does characterizing the state to be an agent of its citizens provide a useful “as if” framework for positive analysis of economic policy? Or, can we understand economic policy only by explicitly characterizing the state as proprietary, the instrument of the ruling elite?
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economics of governance 1 (2000), S. 13-23 
    ISSN: 1435-8131
    Keywords: Key words:Electoral competition, political ambition, ideologues ; JEL classification:D72
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. The process by which high-level office-holders are selected is shown to result in pure office-seeking politicians looking like ideologues.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economics of governance 1 (2000), S. 123-135 
    ISSN: 1435-8131
    Keywords: JEL classification:O10,O17 ; Key words:Institutional Quality, Poverty, Lorenz Curves, Headcount Index, FGT Measures.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. We provide cross-country empirical evidence on the link between measures of institutional development and of poverty over the period 1960-1990. We find that the more efficient the institutions, the lower the degree, severity, and incidence of poverty. We provide both ordinary least squares and two-stages least squares estimates, and show that our results are robust for an overall measure of institutional development as well as for an index of risk of expropriation and quality of the bureaucracy.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economics of governance 1 (2000), S. 137-155 
    ISSN: 1435-8131
    Keywords: Key words: rush, delay, competence, option values, money burning refinement, signalling. ; JEL classification: D72, D82, H50
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. We examine the consequences when the public is unsure about the ability of governments to foresee the effects of decisions. Governments with much information should invest either immediately or never. Governments that are not well informed should wait for better information. But since governments want to signal their abilities to solve problems, we observe rash decisions and problems are portrayed as crises. We also show that excessive delay can occur. Delay or rush occur even if there is very little uncertainty about abilities of governments. We discuss three institutional rules to alleviate the rush and delay bias: Limiting expenditures before elections, experimental clauses or money burning.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Economics of governance 1 (2000), S. 157-179 
    ISSN: 1435-8131
    Keywords: Key words:Larceny, Crime, Government Policy. ; JEL classification:K42, E62, D31
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. A dynamic general equilibrium model of larceny – or property crime – is presented in which both economic conditions and government policies affect the commission calculus. The model provides a behavioral framework that is used to estimate the effects of government policies on the commission of larceny. Calibrating the model using data from cities in Los Angeles County, the impact of a number of government policies and of economic development on larceny are quantified. The simulations show that longer prison sentences and higher conviction rates for criminals are the most effective methods to reduce larceny; subsidizing leisure activities, increasing police expenditures and income transfers have little effect on larceny. Using a game-theoretic optimality criterion, all the policies examined are currently overfunded.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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