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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. v 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 31-42 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Mental representation ; computation ; formal condition ; symbols ; intentionality ; computationalism ; cognition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In response to Michael Morris, I attempt to refute the crucial second premise of the argument, which states that the formality condition cannot be satisfied “non-stipulatively” in computational systems. I defend the view of representation urged in Meaning and Mental Representation against the charge that it makes content stipulative and therefore irrelevant to the explanation of cognition. Some other reservations are expressed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 1-30 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; content ; cognitive science ; mind-body problem ; representation ; semantic ; syntax
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I argue that there are no mental representations, in the sense of “representation” used in standard computational theories of the mind. I take Cummins' Meaning and Mental Representation as my stalking-horse, and argue that his view, once properly developed, is self-defeating. The argument implicitly undermines Fodor's view of the mind; I draw that conclusion out explicitly. The idea of mental representations can then only be saved by appeal to a Dennett-like instrumentalism; so I argue against that too. Finally, I argue that there is no good metaphysical reason in favour of believing in mental representations and that cognitive science can manage perfectly well without them.
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 43-54 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; causality ; cognition ; computation ; explanation ; mind/body problem ; other-minds problem ; robotics ; Searle ; symbol grounding ; Turing Test
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Any attempt to explain the mind by building machines with minds must confront the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is “everything” a body with a mind can do? Turing's original “pen-pal” version of the Turing Test (the TT) only tested linguistic capacity, but Searle has shown that a mindless symbol-manipulator could pass the TT undetected. The Total Turing Test (TTT) calls instead for all of our linguistic and robotic capacities; immune to Searle's argument, it suggests how to ground a symbol manipulating system in the capacity to pick out the objects its symbols refer to. No Turing Test, however, can guarantee that a body has a mind. Worse, nothing in the explanation of its successful performance requires a model to have a mind at all. Minds are hence very different from the unobservables of physics (e.g., superstrings); and Turing Testing, though essential for machine-modeling the mind, can really only yield an explanation of the body.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 55-73 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Belief ; syntax ; propositions ; meaning ; information ; tractability ; degrees of confidence ; dispositions
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Within AI and the cognitively related disciplines, there exist a multiplicity of uses of ‘belief’. On the face of it, these differing uses reflect differing views about the nature of an objective phenomenon called ‘belief’. In this paper I distinguish six distinct ways in which ‘belief’ is used in AI. I shall argue that not all these uses reflect a difference of opinion about an objective feature of reality. Rather, in some cases, the differing uses reflect differing concerns with special AI applications. In other cases, however, genuine differences exist about the nature of what we pre-theoretically call belief. To an extent the multiplicity of opinions about, and uses of ‘belief’, echoes the discrepant motivations of AI researchers. The relevance of this discussion for cognitive scientists and philosophers arises from the fact that (a) many regard theoretical research within AI as a branch of cognitive science, and (b) even if theoretical AI is not cognitive science, trends within AI influence theories developed within cognitive science. It should be beneficial, therefore, to unravel the distinct uses and motivations surrounding ‘belief’, in order to discover which usages merely reflect differing pragmatic concerns, and which usages genuinely reflect divergent views about reality.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 75-95 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Learning ; induction ; logic ; relativism ; epistemology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Rather than attempting to characterize a relation of confirmation between evidence and theory, epistemology might better consider which methods of forming conjectures from evidence, or of altering beliefs in the light of evidence, are most reliable for getting to the truth. A logical framework for such a study was constructed in the early 1960s by E. Mark Gold and Hilary Putnam. This essay describes some of the results that have been obtained in that framework and their significance for philosophy of science, artificial intelligence, and for normative epistemology when truth is relative.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 117-124 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 97-116 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Program verification ; program testing ; defeasible reasoning ; philosophy of computer science
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In this paper I attempt to cast the current program verification debate within a more general perspective on the methodologies and goals of computer science. I show, first, how any method involved in demonstrating the correctness of a physically executing computer program, whether by testing or formal verification, involves reasoning that is defeasible in nature. Then, through a delineation of the senses in which programs can be run as tests, I show that the activities of testing and formal verification do not necessarily share the same goals and thus do not always constitute alternatives. The testing of a program is not always intended to demonstrate a program's correctness. Testing may seek to accept or reject nonprograms including algorithms, specifications, and hypotheses regarding phenomena. The relationship between these kinds of testing and formal verification is couched in a more fundamental relationship between two views of computer science, one properly containing the other.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 129-165 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; cognition ; representation ; information processing ; physical symbol systems ; language of thought
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Cognitive science uses the notion of computational information processing to explain cognitive information processing. Some philosophers have argued that anything can be described as doing computational information processing; if so, it is a vacuous notion for explanatory purposes. An attempt is made to explicate the notions of cognitive information processing and computational information processing and to specify the relationship between them. It is demonstrated that the resulting notion of computational information processing can only be realized in a restrictive class of dynamical systems called physical notational systems (after Goodman's theory of notationality), and that the systems generally appealed to by cognitive science-physical symbol systems-are indeed such systems. Furthermore, it turns out that other alternative conceptions of computational information processing, Fodor's (1975) Language of Thought and Cummins' (1989) Interpretational Semantics appeal to substantially the same restrictive class of systems. The necessary connection of computational information processing with notationality saves the enterprise from charges of vacuousness and has some interesting implications for connectionism. But, unfortunately, it distorts the subject matter and entails some troubling consequences for a cognitive science which tries to make notationality do the work of genuine mental representations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 185-196 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Levels ; decomposition ; explanation ; function
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Marr's account of the analysis of complex information-processing tasks as having three levels — the levels of computational theory, representation and algorithm, and hardware implementation — is reconsidered. I argue that the notion of “level” here runs together two distinctive sort of explanatory shifts — that of grain and that of contextual function. I then offer a revision of the account which avoids this problem, and suggest how this might play a role in the practice of theory evaluation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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