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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of economic design 4 (1999), S. 357-379 
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: JEL classification: H41, H21 ; Key words: Public goods, private provision, neutrality of taxes
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. This paper analyses the effects of taxation and subsidies in an economy with private provision of a public good. It is shown that in a situation where all individuals contribute, taxation affects the equilibrium allocation if and only if at least one individual's voluntary contribution to the public good has an impact on the aggregate tax payments of the others. We then consider linear nonneutral tax-subsidy schemes and analyse efficiency and uniqueness of the resulting Nash equilibria. We show that an efficient Nash equilibrium, where all individuals contribute, will in general not be unique, and establish a non-uniformity property which a tax-subsidy scheme must fulfil in order to induce a unique interior equilibrium that is efficient. Throughout the paper it is assumed that individuals fully understand and take into account the government's budget constraint.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of economic design 4 (1999), S. 389-393 
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: JEL classification: D71, D82 ; Key words: Division problem, uniform rule, strategy-proofness, single-peaked preferences
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. Sprumont (1991) has established that the only allocation rule for the division problem that is strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous is the uniform rule when the domain is the set of all possible profiles of continuous single-peaked preferences. Sprumont's characterization of the uniform rule is shown to hold on any larger domain of single-peaked preferences.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of economic design 5 (2000), S. 1-21 
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: JEL classification:D82, H57 ; Key words:Incentives, multi-period contracts, regulation, procurement, renegotiation proofness, asymmetric information, full pooling
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. This paper analyses multi-period regulation or procurement policies under asymmetric information between the regulator and regulated firms. As well known in the literature, some degree of separation is always optimal under any form of commitment. In contrast, we show that full pooling is optimal under noncommitment when the discount factor is sufficiently high. We also discuss the meaning of full pooling under double randomization. Finally, we provide a graphical analysis of the second-best policy in terms of the regulator's commitment capacity.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of economic design 5 (2000), S. 59-70 
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: JEL classification:D70, D82, C72 ; Key words:Incomplete information, mechanism design, efficient mechanisms, first price auctions
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) prove that if one seller and one buyer have independent private valuations for an indivisible object then no individually rational and incentive compatible trading mechanism can guarantee ex post efficiency when gains from trade are uncertain. Makowski and Mezzetti (1993) show that this is not the case when there are at least two buyers. In the latter context, if the highest possible seller's valuation is not too large, we provide an ex post efficient mechanism in which the mechanism designer and the agents are not required to know the probability distribution for the seller's valuation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of economic design 3 (1997), S. 45-55 
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: Key words: Redistribution mechanisms, compensation, effort, talent JEL classification: D31, D63
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. I study a model where personal income is a function of two different groups of individual characteristics, called “talent” and “effort” respectively. The distinction between these two groups is that society has taken the prior decision that the influence of traits from the first group needs to be moderated by any fair redistribution mechanism while differences in income due to traits from the second group must be preserved. I present two solutions that satisfy several intuitive properties of fairness and I use these properties to characterize both of them.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of economic design 3 (1997), S. 1-13 
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: Key words: Moral hazard, adverse selection, incentive compatibility, agency problem JEL classification:C72, D82
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. For the principal-agent problem with moral hazard and adverse selection we establish that within the collection of all measurable, deterministic contracting mechanisms satisfying the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints there exists one that is optimal for a risk averse principal contracting with a risk averse agent. In addition to demonstrating existence, one of the main contributions of the paper is to show that, in general, centralized contracting implemented via a contracting mechanism is equivalent to delegated contracting implemented via a contract menu. Thus, contracting can always be delegated to the agent without gain or loss to the principal. Based on this result, the existence of an optimal contracting mechanism for the principal-agent problem is established by showing that there exists an optimal contract menu for the equivalent delegated contracting problem.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of economic design 3 (1997), S. 15-27 
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: Key words: Organizations, decentralization, parallel processing JEL classification: D83, D23
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. This paper defines and characterizes essential decentralized networks for calculating the associative aggregate of one or more cohorts of data. A network is essential if it is not possible to eliminate an instruction or manager and still calulate the aggregate of each cohort. We show that for essential networks, the graphs that depict the operations and data dependencies are trees or forests. These results assist in the characterization of efficient networks.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of economic design 3 (1997), S. 29-43 
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: Key words: Voluntary provision of public goods, Stackelberg games JEL classification: H 41
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good. The Stackelberg leader is willing to accept such transfers if the actual contribution game is fully non-cooperative because the transfer generates a Pareto superior outcome. If the contributions in the Stackelberg equilibrium is the threat point of a possible cooperative Nash bargaining game, the Stackelberg leader will refuse to accept the transfer if she can.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of economic design 3 (1998), S. 129-135 
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: JEL classification: C60, C70, D51 Key words: Atomless exchange economy, core, equal treatment, measurable correspondence
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to prove the equal treatment property for the $\star$ -core allocations of an atomless economy without any condition on the data of economy. This result prompts the same property for the core allocations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Review of economic design 3 (1997), S. 75-89 
    ISSN: 1434-4750
    Keywords: Key words:Intermediation, bid, ask, matching, Walrasian equilibrium JEL classification: C72, C78, L12
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. We show that a profit maximizing monopolistic intermediary may behave approximately like a Walrasian auctioneer by setting bid and ask prices nearly equal to Walrasian equilibrium prices. In our model agents choose to trade either through the intermediary or privately. Buyers (sellers) trading through the intermediary potentially trade immediately at the ask (bid) price, but sacrifice the spread as gains. A buyer or seller who trades privately shares all the gains to trade with this trading partner, but risks costly delay in finding a partner. We show that as the cost of delay vanishes, the equilibrium bid and ask prices converge to the Walrasian equilibrium prices.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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