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    München: Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
    Publication Date: 2020-05-19
    Description: We analyze a two-period agency problem with limited liability and nonverifiable information. The principal commits to a dynamic bonus pool comprising a fixed total payment that may be distributed over time to the agent and a third party. We find that the optimal two-period contract features memory. If the agent succeeds in the first-period, second-period incentives are weakened whereas higher-powered incentives are provided if he fails. The two-period bonus pool offers a complementary reason for why third-party payments are not commonly observed in practice.
    Keywords: ddc:330
    Language: English
    Type: doc-type:workingPaper
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